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WORKING THE COMMON LAW PURE: DEVELOPING THE LAW OF
DELICT (TORTS) IN LIGHT OF THE SPIRIT, PURPORT AND
OBJECTS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BILL OF RIGHTS
Christopher J. Roederer*
[T]he common law . . . works itself pure by rules drawn from the
fountain of justice.+
The darkest thing about Africa has always been our ignorance of
it.++
INTRODUCTION
South Africa lies at the Southern tip of the African continent nearly 8,000
miles away from the U.S. It has eleven different official languages1 and combines
significant populations from Africa, India, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. It is home to the cradle of humankind, where archeologists have found
about 40% of the world’s human ancestor fossils.2 It also has large numbers of
elephants, giraffes, lions, rhinoceroses, and zebras. As exotic as this may sound,
there are no tigers, except in the zoo, no cannibals, unless you count the spiders, 3
and no headhunters, unless you are looking for the right person to fill an executive
*
Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law; Senior Research
Fellow, University of the Witwatersrand School of Law. The author thanks the panelists
from the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting panel on Comparative
Tort Law: Beyond Europe, organized by the Torts and Compensation Section, the
numerous members of the section who attended and provoked further thought on these
issues, and in particular, Ellen Bublik, who brought us all together for this panel. I also
thank the many colleagues at Florida Coastal who attended the presentation of this paper at
the AALS as well as Brian Foley, Michael Lewyn, Elizabeth DeCoux, and Itzchak
Kornfeld for comments on earlier drafts of this work. The research was made possible by a
summer research grant from Florida Coastal School of Law. Finally, special thanks go to
my research assistants. Jessica R. Rieffel worked tirelessly on the bulk of this paper up to
the Conference, and Nina L. Banaie has been wonderful in helping me put the final touches
on the piece.
+ Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 22-23 (P.C.) (U.K.) (Lord
Mansfield).
++ George Kimble, Africa Today: The Lifting Darkness, REPORTER, May 15, 1951.
1. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 1, § 6(1).
2. Lucille Davie, Showcasing Humankind's Cradle, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO, Mar. 22,
2005, http://www.southafrica.info/travel/cultural/cradle-centre.htm.
3. Unless one counts the baboon spider, a large tarantula species that often engages
in cannibalism. Ansie Dippenaar-Schoeman, The Baboon Spiders of South Africa, SCI. IN
AFR., Nov. 2002, http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2002/november/baboon.htm.
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position, a professorial chair, or law school deanship. South Africa can be exotic,
opaque, and strange, or it can be as familiar, transparent, and mundane as one’s
local shopping mall.4
Contrary to the literature that pigeonholes South Africa’s legal tradition
as something akin to a cave and its jurists as introspective hermits or monks,
South Africa boasts one of the most open and cosmopolitan legal traditions known
to humankind. I will not reveal all the mysteries of South Africa, or even all the
mysteries surrounding the development of the law of delict in that country.
However, I will shed light on some key features of South Africa’s open legal
tradition as well as the mechanisms at its disposal for developing its common law,
and in particular, its law of delict. Throughout, I will be comparing and
contrasting how the law in the United States (U.S.) and in South Africa has been
developing, or “working itself pure.” The contrast here is sharp. While in the
U.S., the common law of torts has atrophied, in South Africa, it is thriving; while
South Africa’s law of delict is developing and working itself pure by drawing
from South Africa’s fountain of justice, namely the spirit, purport, and objects of
its bill of rights, the U.S. common law of torts has been in decline over the last 20
years or so, largely due to a wave of regressive legislative tort reforms.
Part I of this article both situates the South African legal system within a
group of systems referred to as mixed jurisdictions and distinguishes it from that
group by highlighting South Africa’s open, cosmopolitan tradition. Part II
addresses the question of South Africa’s “relevance for us.” This section draws
on the lessons of a number of approaches to comparative law and makes the case
that South Africa’s law of delict is neither too unique nor too familiar for fruitful
and interesting comparisons to the U.S. law of torts. It accomplishes this by
explaining a number of core similarities and pointing out some key differences
between the U.S. and South African approaches to torts and delict. Part III
addresses the desirability of harmonizing the Constitutions of the U.S. and South
Africa with the private law in these countries. This section also addresses the
need in the U.S. and South Africa for what is called horizontal application (the
application of constitutional rights to persons in their relations with other persons).
Part IV returns to the theme of South Africa’s open tradition by detailing the
mechanisms in South Africa for developing the common law in general and the
law of delict in particular.
According to Jonathan Burchell, South African delict, not unlike torts, is

4. South Africa is in fact a place with many pockets of extremes, from the
multitudes of fancy shopping malls that could be found in half the suburbs of America to
the shanty-towns at the edges of townships, from its world-class modern infrastructure
linking the country, to the expansive nature preserves. It boasts some of the finest
academics, scientists and jurists in the world, yet it has a very high infant mortality rate,
HIV rate and is one of the most unequal countries in the world. It combines, in part, the
best and worst of human achievements and continues to separate, in part, the best and worst
of human achievements.
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“dynamic—it can, and does, develop to meet the needs of a changing society.”5
Unfortunately, under Apartheid, the law of delict primarily served a subset of
South African society. It did not draw from the fount of justice in order to work
its common law pure during this period. Apartheid delict did not generally consist
of blatant racist or sexist decisions; it had a veneer of neutrality. However, that
veneer not only masked the inequality beneath, but protected it. It further
entrenched inequality through a conservative libertarian bias that assumed the
freedom and equality of persons while the Apartheid apparatus ensured that the
opposite was true. At best, the development of South African delict was arrested
during the Apartheid era.6 The end of Apartheid not only provided for the
transformation of South Africa’s public law, it also provided mechanisms for the
transformation of South African private law, including the law of delict. South
Africa’s final Constitution reinvigorated the claims of Lord Mansfield and
Professor Burchell, by providing a framework for South Africa to continue the
process of working the common law pure via the fountain of justice. The fountain
of justice referred to here is not a reference to divine natural law or even to
abstract reasoning, but is a reference to the conception(s) of justice embodied in
the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights. South Africa’s Constitution
directs its jurists to that fountain in § 39(2), which provides that “when developing
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” Part IV explores the meaning
of this provision along with § 8(2), which provides for the application of the Bill
of Rights to natural and juristic persons. These provisions present a tall order for
the courts to fill. Although there is room for criticizing the South African
judiciary’s attempts to fill the order, one should not expect perfection. If it was
easy to determine what justice required, there would be little need for working the
common law pure on a case-by-case basis.
As will be demonstrated below, the constitutional text does not provide,
and the courts have not settled on, a single comprehensive and coherent fount of
justice for working South Africa’s common law pure. Nonetheless, there is
considerable evidence that the courts are striving to fill that order. The spirit and
purpose of South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation was to bring about a
legal revolution rather than a bloody revolution. The Constitution drew from, and
was designed to carry through, the struggle to end the oppression, gross
inequality, and discrimination suffered by the vast majority of South Africans
made possible by Apartheid public and private law. In doing so, the Constitution,
like the struggle, drew from international human rights law, both as a means and
as justification for overcoming Apartheid and its lingering effects. Although the
5. JONATHAN BURCHELL, PRINCIPLES OF DELICT, at V (Juta & Co., Ltd. 1993).
6. For a fully developed argument on this point, see Christopher J. Roederer, The
Transformation of South African Private Law after Ten Years of Democracy: The Role of
Torts (Delict) in the Consolidation of Democracy, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 447521 (2006) [hereinafter Roederer, Democracy].
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text does not point inexorably to a single conception of justice for harmonizing the
multitude of values that make up the spirit, purport, and objects of South Africa’s
Constitution and Bill of Rights, the text, along with South Africa’s political
history overwhelmingly support a transformative egalitarian conception of justice.
I. THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL TRADITION: MIXED BUT NOT
MIXED UP
The title of this symposium suggests that there may be something
secondary about comparative law outside of Europe. Europe, with its two grand
traditions of civil law and common law, is the touchstone for departure. These
European traditions dominate, not only within Europe, but throughout the world.
Moreover, as a result of colonization, a majority of jurisdictions fall within one or
the other tradition.7 South Africa is not even secondary in this way, as it does not
fit into one or the other. Rather, it falls into what Vernon Palmer has termed the
7. According to the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law Study of World Legal
Systems, the number of common law jurisdictions is 43; the number of civil law
jurisdictions is 87; and the number of mixed jurisdictions is 14. There are only 3 pure
customary law jurisdictions and numerous jurisdictions where the mix is between
customary law and either the civil law or the common, or both (26, 15, and 5 respectively).
The numbers for Muslim jurisdictions is similar with 2 pure, 11 mixed with civil law, 6
mixed with common law and 5 mixed with both. There are 4 countries in which the mix is
Muslim, customary, and civil and 6 where the mix is Muslim, customary, and common law.
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law Civil Law Section, Alphabetic Index of Legal
Jurisdictions, http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/eng-tableau.php (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009). It is common for treatises and scholarly comparative work to at least
begin with different legal families or legal traditions on the macro scale. Rene David broke
down the main families into Civil, Common Law, and Socialist, adding as “other,” Jewish,
Hindu, Asian, and African. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 18, 27, 28
(3d ed., Stevens Publishing 1985) (1968). Zweigert and Kötz break the systems down
further into Romanist, Germanic, Anglo-American, and Nordic families, with the residual
categories of law in the Far East and Religious based legal systems. KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 63-73 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998) (1977). H. Patrick Glenn divides up the legal traditions of the
world into Chthonic, Talmudic, Civil, Islamic, Common, and Hindu. See generally H.
PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW
(2000) [hereinafter GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS]. Glenn uses the idea of a tradition rather
than a system or family because he views systems and families as being exclusive and
traditions as inclusive or at least as permeable. H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal
Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 421, 425 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2006). There is nothing magical about these different categories. One can proliferate the
number of traditions, families, and subfamilies if one wishes. One could have a family for
former colonies, or the former colonies of Great Britain, France, etc.
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“third legal family,” a tertiary group of countries.8 South Africa is a mixed
jurisdiction with both separate and overlapping influences from Roman-Dutch
law, English common law, indigenous law, and religious law.9
The theme of much of the writing about mixed jurisdictions is one of
remoteness and isolation. It is common for authorities on the subject to claim that
these mixed jurisdictions lived largely in both physical and intellectual isolation
from each other.10 As Vernon Palmer put it in a recent article on the subject:
8. VERNON VALANTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY 4 (Vernon Valantine Palmer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter
PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS]. Palmer included South Africa, Scotland, Quebec, Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, Louisiana, and Israel in his study, but mentions other smaller mixed
jurisdictions, including: Saint Lucia, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia. Id. Palmer recognizes the marginal nature of mixed
systems in a recent article, where he notes, “[a]ll efforts at classification in standard works
have resulted in their marginalization and have not succeeded in giving closer analysis to
their common traits and shared experiences.” Vernon Valantine Palmer, Wilson Memorial
Address at the Edinburgh University Second Worldwide Congress on Mixed Jurisdiction:
Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems 2, in 12.1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008), available
at http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-16.pdf [hereinafter Palmer, Rival Theories].
9. When the British took over the Cape in 1812, their policy was to allow local laws
to remain in force if they were sufficiently civilized. As a result, the British recognized the
law of the Dutch settlers, but did not recognize the laws of the indigenous peoples at the
Cape, particularly the Khoe and San. T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
35 (Juta 2004). As the Colonies expanded across the region and more organized tribes
were confronted and “subdued,” the policy of non-recognition gave out to one of partial
recognition. Id. at 37. In some parts only the law of intestate succession was recognized,
while in others, civil suits between Africans was to be decided by the application of
custom. Id. at 37-40. Soon after South Africa was consolidated as the Union of South
Africa, its policy turned to one of segregation, with customary law applying to Africans in
their areas and before their tribunals and European law applying in European areas in front
of British style courts. Id. at 41-42. This changed with the end of Apartheid. The
Constitution now recognizes customary law and requires that it be applied when it is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation addressing the issue. Id. at 42-43
(citing S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 211(3)). Although the question of when customary law is
applicable can be a complex choice of law question, there are several factors that help a
court make the determination, ranging from agreement by the parties, the nature of prior
transactions (did they follow customary practices), the subject matter and environment of
the transaction (e.g. was it local), the form of the transaction (e.g. did they follow
customary rules regarding marriage in the formation of the marriage), and the way the
parties live. Id. at 54-57. Where customary law has been allowed to govern, it has been
subject to the test of conformity with public policy. If the customary rule or practice was
deemed “uncivilized,” immoral, contrary to natural justice or public policy, it would be
trumped with the common law. T.W. Bennett, Comparative Law and African Customary
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 642, 645 n.11,
666-71 [hereinafter Bennett, Comparative Law] (citing Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng.
Rep. 1045, 1048 (K.B.) as the source of the rule).
10. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 8, at 3. Part of Palmer’s project in
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[T]he mixed jurisdictions, up until relatively recently, have lived
their entire existence in a kind of physical and intellectual
isolation, cut off from family members around the world. They
have been great solitaries, separated by the oceans, the currents
and the continents. Each seemed to be one of a kind, something
unique and peculiar, a wayward child who was destined to
develop introspectively, conscious of its “otherness”, unclear as
to the nature of its laws, uncertain what to call itself, ambiguous
as to its place among the world’s legal systems.11
With globalization, every “legal system” is mixed to some degree. As
Vernon Palmer notes in his more recent work, if one looks at the concept
factually, as “the presence or interaction of two or more kinds of laws or legal
traditions” within a given jurisdiction, then most of Africa, Asia, and India fall
into this category.12 In fact, given this definition, countries that are classically
categorized as either purely common law like England, Canada, and the United
States, or purely civil law, like France, Germany, and Switzerland, are mixed.13 If
one views the concept in this way, Palmer’s claims about the nature of mixed
collecting the various country reports and combining them in one work was to end the
intellectual isolation of the various jurisdictions within the mixed family. See also Jacques
DuPlessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 477, 479-80 (note that DuPlessis is a
South African Academic).
11. Palmer, Rival Theories, supra note 8, at 2. As will be argued below, South Africa
is not easily captured by this depiction of a mixed legal system. Alan Watson indicates that
South Africa is unique in having such an intense cosmopolitan approach to the law, at least
in the modern period. ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 41 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1981). While South Africa may be unique among countries in terms of its
cosmopolitan nature, I am not convinced that either Scotland or Sri Lanka (the two other
countries often grouped with South Africa as having a common Roman law and common
law heritage) have developed in this isolated way either.
12. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems . . . and the Myth of Pure Law,
67 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (2007) [hereinafter Palmer, Myth of Pure Law].
13. Palmer notes that if having a mixed legal system is defined in this way, then the
concept is as broad as that of legal pluralism. Id. at 1205-06 (citing DuPlessis, supra note
10, at 483 n.17). The problem with substituting “mixed” with “pluralist” is that pluralist
systems are generally considered systems in which two or more traditions coexist within a
jurisdiction but do not mix. Rather, one set of laws from one tradition applies to one group
of people (e.g., the indigenous population), while another set applies to another group (e.g.,
the colonizer). South Africa is pluralist in this sense. Mixed jurisdictions of the kind
referred to here involve the application of one tradition across a given domain (e.g., the
civil law being applied across the private law domain) while the other tradition applies
across another domain (e.g., British law applied across the public law and procedural law
domains). Thus, South Africa is also mixed in this sense.
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systems lose all of their force (unless it can be said that every country has lived in
physical and intellectual isolation as introspective, wayward children that are
unclear as to the nature of their laws). Viewed in this way, what separates “mixed
legal systems” from other systems may be more a matter of degree than a matter
of kind.
The concept as traditionally used, and as used in Palmer’s study, MIXED
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY, is narrower than that of
a mixed or plural system. As Palmer notes, there are at least three features that
distinguish the “mixed legal system” from other systems, namely that:
• The common law and civil law form the core foundations of
the system;
• The mixture is obvious to the ordinary observer; and
• The civil law component is confined to the private law, while
the common law component dominates the public law.14
As a historical matter, it is understandable that western comparative law
scholars, steeped in either the common law or civil law tradition, would view
jurisdictions that combined the two as a third family. However, this way of using
the concept is problematic for two related reasons. First, it privileges the
colonizers’ legal systems over that of the colonized, excluding jurisdictions where
the mixture is between indigenous law (or what Glenn refers to as chthonic law15)
and colonial law.16 Thus, India (which combines indigenous law, religious law,
and the English common law) is excluded from the family, while South Africa is
included only because of its mix of civil and common law and not because of its
indigenous law or its religious legal elements.17 Second, this narrow interpretation
14. Palmer, Rival Theories, supra note 8, at 7-9. The reference to common law here
is not to judge-made law but to the substantive law of England. Note, however, that
English law has had, and continues to have considerable influence over the law of Delict.
See infra part II.B; infra text accompanying notes 60-63, 65-66, 69-70. Note also that the
private law is no longer insulated from the public law and its values. See infra parts III &
IV.
15. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 7, at 56-85.
16. Palmer, Rival Theories, supra note 8, at 24-27. Palmer reserves the notion of
legal pluralism for the range of other mixtures (e.g. religious, indigenous, etc.).
17. Id. at 24, 27. Palmer appears to recognize the colonial elitist overtones of his
previous work in his latter article in the Louisiana Law Review. This later article
deconstructs the concept of a mixed legal system for the purpose of arguing that “mixed”
legal systems are the norm. As he states, “[a] factual approach forces us to consider them
as the norm rather than the exception, as the general pattern of legal development rather
than historical accidents.” Palmer, Myth of Pure Law, supra note 12, at 1218. This is a
plausible revision if one reduces the classical concept of a mixed legal system to that of
system with mixed legal influences. The study by the University of Ottawa Law Faculty
places 86 jurisdictions within the category of mixed legal systems which it defines as
including “. . . political entities where two or more systems apply cumulatively or
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of the family of “mixed jurisdictions” implies that there are only two great
families and that others are either a mixture of these two (the third family) or are
even more peripheral. Given the richness and diversity of legal traditions and the
multitude of approaches to categorizing legal traditions and systems, this is too
narrow a view.18
Nonetheless, as a result of serial colonization, there are many
jurisdictions that have a private law that “is essentially a structured blend of civil
law and common law.”19 For the most part, the jurisdictions in question are mixed
because they were first colonized by one of three civil law colonial powers
(French, Spanish or Dutch) and then they were either colonized by Britain or the
United Sates.20 The reason for this ordering is partially based on the timing of
colonial ascendance, with the British and Americans taking over through conquest
or cession from former civilian colonizers, and partially based on the British
practice of keeping the “substantive” private law of its colonies intact while
imposing English procedural law and public law.21 Thus, this conception of the
mixed legal system privileges the colonizer because its roots are largely in the
colonial experience.
As noted above, South Africa shares in the mixed tradition with a
structured mixture of Roman-Dutch law and Common Law (among others).22
Roman-Dutch law is the term used for the law of the Netherlands, which
developed along Roman law lines from the twelfth century up to the arrival of the
Napoleonic code in the Netherlands in 1809.23 This uncodified Roman-Dutch law
was transplanted to the Cape in the seventeenth century with the arrival of the
Dutch East India Company.24 When the English came to the Cape in the late
interactively, but also entities where there is a juxtaposition of systems as a result of more
or less clearly defined fields of application.” JuriGlobe–World Legal Systems, University
of Ottawa, Mixed Legal Systems (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/classpoli/sys-mixtes.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Mixed Legal Systems].
However, it is unclear why one would want to abandon the category of mixed common law
and civil law legal systems. It should be renamed, or at least one should be clear that when
speaking of a “mixed legal system” we mean mixed common law and civil law systems,
but it makes little sense to eviscerate the category because it has an unfortunate label. See
Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 20 (2003).
18. See supra text accompanying note 1; Mixed Legal Systems, supra note 17
(breaking down mixed (or plural) systems into eleven different subcategories).
19. Palmer, Myth of Pure Law, supra note 12, at 1217.
20. See DuPlessis, supra note 10, at 479.
21. See supra text accompanying note 9.
22. The Netherlands Colony of the Cape was founded in 1652. It was occupied by
the British in 1806 and formally ceded to them by the Treaty of Paris in 1814. It was
organized as a Crown Colony and was granted self-governance in 1872. The cape became
a province of the Union of South Africa in 1910. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 7, at 23133.
23. Id. at 232.
24. Id. at 231-32.
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1700s they did not impose English common law on the territory.25 Rather, they
simply imposed English public law and procedure (including a judicial system
based on the English model) on top of the civil law base.
A. South Africa has Not Spent its Existence in Physical and Intellectual
Isolation
The theme of isolation, often associated with mixed jurisdictions, is not
completely alien to South Africa. It is consistent with accounts of South Africa
being isolated from the international community and international law,26
particularly during the Apartheid period.27 But even here, the isolation was as
25. This practice can be traced back to William the Conqueror’s respect for the
English common law or customary law when he conquered England and was a well-settled
feature of English colonial practice. Id. at 182, 220; Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep.
1045, 1047 (1774) (setting forth the English constitutional rule that “the laws of a
conquered country continue in force, until they are altered by the conqueror”).
26. South Africa was a member of the League of Nations, and was elected a member
of the Council in 1939. JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE 19 (Juta 2005) (1994). A South African was elected President of the
League’s General Assembly in 1933, and General Smuts, South Africa’s Prime Minister
took part in drafting the U.N. Charter, in particular its preamble. Id. at 19-20.
27. As John Dugard states in his Preface:
[i]nternational law has been applied by South African courts for more
than a century in cases arising from the country’s vibrant commercial
life and conflict-ridden political history. Apartheid was a setback to the
development of international law in South Africa as both executive and
courts viewed international law as a hostile legal order whose
prescriptions on human rights and self-determination were
incompatible with domestic law.
Id. at vii. But see Michael P. Lowry, Legitimizing Elections Through the Regulation of
Campaign Financing: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis and Hope for South Africa,
31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185 (2008). Lowry concluded his article by noting that
South Africa “has [done] as well as may be realistically expected” in making progress in its
transition to democracy and equality given “the problems inherent in overcoming decades
of repressive government and international isolation[.]” Id. at 212. As Justice O’Regan
wrote in her concurring opinion in Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa,
“[O]ur Constitution recognises and asserts that, after decades of isolation, South Africa is
now a member of the community of nations, and a bearer of obligations and responsibilities
in terms of international law.” 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) at 299 (S. Afr.).
See Neville Botha, The Coming of Age of Public International Law in South Africa,
1992-1993 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 38 (arguing that South African judges had a poor grasp
of international law during Apartheid). See also John Dugard, The South African Judiciary
and International Law in the Apartheid Era, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 110 (1998)
[hereinafter South African Judiciary].
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much imposed as it was by choice.28 It is easy to conclude from South Africa’s
isolation from international law developments (particularly in the area of human
rights) that this was typical of the South African legal experience. Such a view is
fortified by the fact that during the Apartheid period, a number of South African
academics, judges, and practitioners consciously turned away from English
common law sources, and in fact sought to purge the English influence from
private law.29
Although the case can be made that South Africa was isolated from the
world during the height of the Apartheid era,30 for most of its history as an
independent state, South Africa’s status as a “mixed” jurisdiction has led the
country to borrow from legal traditions around the world. Even when they turned
away from common law sources during Apartheid, South African academics,
practitioners, and judges did not merely turn inward, but reached out to those in
the civil law tradition.31 Rather than acting as an isolating factor, South Africa’s
status as a mixed jurisdiction has added to its cosmopolitan nature. As will be
demonstrated below, this spirit was renewed with a vengeance following the end
of Apartheid.
1. South Africa Was Not Isolated From its Siblings
While some “mixed” offspring may have remained isolated, there is
considerable evidence of cross-pollination between South Africa and its siblings.
28. John Dugard argues that the United Nations shares the blame for South Africa’s
negative contribution to international law because of its efforts to exclude it from
international organizations and from law making conferences. DUGARD, supra note 26, at
21. South Africa was the one of the most prominent states on the U.N. agenda from the
1950s to the 1990s, as it was the subject of numerous resolutions, sanctions, and the denial
of a U.N. General Assembly seat to the government representatives from South Africa from
1974 to 1994. Id. at 7, 20-21, 481. See G.A. Res. 3207, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. (Sept. 30,
1974).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
30. DUGARD, supra note 26, at 21.
31. See infra Part II.B. Justice L.C. Steyn, who was Chief Justice of the Appellate
Division from 1959 to 1971, is credited for calling on South African jurists to move beyond
English sources and to embrace continental sources. Edwin Cameron, Legal Chauvinism,
Executive-Mindedness and Justice – L C Steyn’s Impact on South African Law 99 S. AFR.
L.J. 38, 50 (1982). This was part of Chief Justice Steyn’s efforts to purify South African
law of its English influence. Cameron notes the irony that the courts really did not follow
Steyn in referring to continental sources. Id. at 50-51. He also noted that reports in the late
1970s showed that while only five out of 684 reported cases cited continental sources, one
out of every seven cases included references to English or Commonwealth sources. Id. at
51. References to Roman or Roman-Dutch sources occurred in only one out of every
eighteen reported cases. Id. Thus, even at the height of Apartheid, English sources of law
predominated.
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South Africa’s mixed siblings include Sri Lanka and Scotland. Like South Africa,
Sri Lanka was colonized by the Dutch, and then by the British.32 Scotland does
not share the same colonial experience; rather, it received the Roman civil law,
along with the rest of continental Europe, prior to unification with England in
1707.33 While there are considerably more references to “Scots law” in the South
African Law Reports and in the academic literature34 than to Ceylon Law, or now
Sri Lankan law, references to Ceylon law are substantial.35 Although there is
32. Sri Lanka, previously Ceylon, was first colonized by the Sinhalese from northern
India in the 6th century B.C. Tamils established a kingdom in northern Sri Lanka in the
14th century and the Portuguese controlled the coastal areas of the island in the 16th
century. The Dutch took over during the 17th century and the English took over at the end
of the 18th Century and the beginning of the 19th Century. Ceylon gained its independence
in 1948 and changed its name to Sri Lanka in 1972. See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency,
The World Fact Book, Sri Lanka, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ce.html (last updated Mar. 19, 2009). See also S. ARASARATNAM, CEYLON
41-42, 98-116, and 124-73 (1964).
33. Elspeth Reid, Scotland: Scotland (Report 1), in PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 8, at 201-02. Roman law gained considerable influence in Scotland during the
16th century when Scottish professional lawyers were trained in continental Europe
(largely in either France or the Netherlands). Robert Eslie, Scotland (Report 2), in PALMER,
MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 8, at 241. Scotland’s integration with England shielded
its Roman-based common law from the spread of codification brought about by Napoleon
at the beginning of the 19th Century. Id.
34. There is at least one reference to “Scots Law” in nearly every year of the South
African Law Reports from 1947 to the present. There is a strong tradition of academic
exchanges between South Africa and Scotland and a number of South African academics
hold academic positions in Scotland, including Professor Cornelius G. Van Der Merwe,
Professor Reinhard Zimmermann, and Professor David L. Carey Miller.
35. David L. Carey Miller, Three of a Kind? Positive Prescription in Sri Lanka,
South Africa and Scotland, 12.1 ELEC. J. COMP. L., at 4 & n.18 (2008),
http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-3.pdf (arguing that there is negligible reference to Sri
Lankan sources in South African Law) (citing L.J.M. COORAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF SRI LANKA 95-96 (2d ed. Lake House Invs. 1992)). Professor Miller,
who has authored and co-authored works on South African property law, personally attests
to the negligible reference to Sri Lankan sources. Id. at 4. Miller wrote THE ACQUISITION
AND PROTECTION OF OWNERSHIP (1986) and co-authored with Anne Pope, TITLE TO LAND
IN SOUTH AFRICA (2000). Nonetheless, there are periodic references in the law reports to
case law and commentary on the law of Ceylon, now Sri Lanka (particularly cases heard on
appeal by the Privy Council). JAMES CECIL WALTER PEREIRA, THE LAWS OF CEYLON (2d
ed. H.C. Cottle 1913) is sometimes referenced in the case law and in the area of Delict, the
work of Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe is often referenced. E.g., CHITTHARANJAN FELIX
AMERASINGHE, DEFAMATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ‘ACTO INIURIARUM’ IN ROMANDUTCH LAW (IN CEYLON & SOUTH AFRICA) (1968); Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, The
Protection of Corpus in Roman-Dutch Law, 84 S. AFR. L.J. 56 (1967). Professor Ellison
Kahn, the editor-in-chief of the South African Law Journal acknowledged the contributions
of “eminent judges, practitioners and academics from abroad” from 1949 to 1983,
including, “from Sri Lanka, Professor C. F. Amerasinghe, Professor L. J. M. Cooray, L.
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continued interest in Scots law among South African academics, evidence of
current interest in Sri Lankan law amongst South African academics is difficult to
find.36 South African authorities have had a much greater influence on Sri Lankan
Law. David L. Carey Miller, in Three of a Kind? Positive Prescription in Sri
Lanka, South Africa and Scotland, notes that it is trite that South African RomanDutch private law has been influential in the development of Sri Lankan private
law and that this influence was present from very early in the colonial
experience.37 It is, however, unclear what, if any, influence South Africa and Sri
Lanka have had on Scots law.38
2. South Africa was Not Isolated From its “Parents”
Even if it could be argued that South African private law developed in
isolation from its siblings, it cannot be seriously contended that South Africa
developed in isolation from its parents.39 From early on, South Africa’s legal elite
Kadirgamar, M. Sornarajah, Professor G. L. Peiris, R. S. de Soysa[.]” Ellison Kahn, The
Birth and Life of the South African Law Journal, 100 S. AFR. L.J. 594, 634 (1983). He also
acknowledged Professor Sir Thomas B. Smith and Sheriff John G. Wilson from Scotland
along with three jurists from the U.S., nine from England, and one each from Canada,
Israel, Botswana, and Australia. Id.
The only South African Constitutional Court case to address Sri Lankan law was Fose
v Minister of Safety and Security, 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at 814-15 (S. Afr.). The Court
performed a rather exhaustive comparative review of the approach to punitive damages for
the violation of constitutional rights by the state. See generally id. The Court did not give
any special pride of place to Sri Lanka, although the decision of the Sri Lankan Supreme
Court in Saman v. Leeladasa & Another 1989 (1) Sri. L.R. 1 (Sri Lanka) was held to be
instructive and was ultimately consistent with the Constitutional Court’s decision in Fose.
Id. at 815. The court also reviewed the approach to this issue in India, Germany, Ireland,
New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and the European Union.
Id. Although the case was at the intersection of delict and constitutional law (i.e. private
and public law), the Court made no mention of the fact that Sri Lanka shared the same
Roman-Dutch heritage or was a similarly mixed legal system.
36. This is the case even though the Sri Lankan experience is more comparable than
the Scottish experience to the South African experience.
37. Miller, supra note 35, at 3 n.10. Miller, in note 11, by example cited the case of
Silva v. Mohamedu, 1916 (19) NLR 426 (CC) (Sri Lanka) in which “the Sri Lankan
Supreme Court followed the South African Appellate Division in Breytenbach v Frankel
and Hochstadter, [1913 (390) W.L.D. (AD) (S. Afr.)] regarding a minor’s contract
agreeing to the disposal of property.” Miller, supra note 35 at 3 n.11. In fact he goes so far
as to cite one authority for the view that some treatises on the law in Sri Lanka devote a
majority of work to the treatment of South African cases. Id. at 3 & n.15 (citing Cooray,
supra note 35, at 95-96).
38. I am unaware of any authority addressing the issue.
39. This was, in part, the point of Kutner’s work on the top ten delict cases in South
Africa during the 1980s. See Peter B. Kutner, Tort Cases in the South African Appellate
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were freed up by their somewhat unique situation. Rather than isolating
themselves and turning inward, their mixed status opened them up to the
possibility of borrowing from the insight and wisdom of jurists from around the
globe. Thus, as early as 1887, Victor Sampson wrote, “[t]o say that there is not a
book of law in the whole civilised world which may not possibly be an authority
in the . . . [South African] Courts, is not to go beyond the truth.”40 To this day,
South African jurists make heavy use of the works of Roman-Dutch and English
jurists.41 Thus, references to Dutch and British authority overwhelm references to
Scottish and Sri Lankan legal authority. The leading South African treatises on
delict contain numerous references to English Common law authority and to
Roman-Dutch law authority.42
Division: A Top Ten of the Eighties, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 311 (1992). Note that
there is something odd about referring to Roman-Dutch law and English law as the parents
of South African law given that they were forced on South Africa. To stretch the metaphor,
it could be said that while South Africa’s indigenous mother still has some influence, she
does not really have joint custody of the legal system.
40. Victor Sampson, Sources of Cape Law, 4 CAPE L.J. 109, 109-10 (1887).
Sampson was an advocate of the high court of the Cape and was later the attorney general
of
the
colony
from
1904
to
1908.
See
The
Cape,
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Rotunda/2209/Cap.html (last accessed Apr. 1, 2009).
41. This is only partially true because Roman-Dutch law ceased to exist in the
Netherlands after the adoption of the Napoleonic Code in 1806. Thus, while the Dutch
Colonies in South Africa and Sri Lanka continued to use Roman-Dutch law, they could no
longer draw from the Netherlands after that point. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 7, at 232.
42. See P.Q.R. BOBERG, THE LAW OF DELICT: VOLUME ONE: AQUALIAN LIABILITY
(rev. reprint Juta & Co. 1989) (1984) [hereinafter BOBERG, DELICT]. Boberg’s work is
probably the most highly regarded work in South Africa on the subject. In it, the author
refers to some 130 other common law cases [excluding Zimbabwean cases]. Twelve of the
leading cases are referred to over 140 times throughout the book and the 130 remaining
cases are cited over 250 times altogether. In total, there are nearly 400 references to
common law cases in his book. Note that Boberg’s book does not address the Actio
Injuriarum which includes defamation and other intentional injuries to one’s rights (e.g.,
privacy, dignity, etc.). Note also that there are over 4,000 references to cases in this book.
In all, almost one tenth of the references to cases are to common law cases outside of
Southern Africa. McKerron references some 378 common law cases out of approximately
1,500 cases cited (approximately one quarter). R.G. MCKERRON, THE LAW OF DELICT: A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY FOR CIVIL WRONGS IN THE LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA, at xvii-xlii (7th ed. Juta & Co., Ltd. 1971) (1933). In his index, he notes the cases
where the facts are given some treatment. Id. Here the ratio of common law cases to South
African cases rises to approximately 72 out of 190 cases (over one-third). Johnathan
Burchell refers to approximately 50 common law cases out of the approximately 450 cases
he cites. BURCHELL, supra note 5. Johan Neethling only refers to 13 common law cases out
of almost 1,500 cases. J. NEETHLING ET AL., LAW OF DELICT 399-430 (J.C. Knobel trans.,
4th ed. Butterworths 2001) (1991). Only one of the 13 cases is referred to more than once
in the work. Id. The first three casebooks on delict were written in English by academics
at English institutions in South Africa, while the fourth was written in Afrikaans by
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II. THE RELEVANCE FOR US
The fact that South Africa has a long tradition of cosmopolitan legal
development makes it an interesting legal system to study; but it is fair to ask
whether its unique nature reduces its value “for us” to little more than a
curiosity.43 Why spend time on South Africa rather than the U.K., other common
law jurisdictions, or other pure civil law systems? The answer to this question
depends in large measure on what approach one takes to the study of comparative
law.
There is a range of approaches to the study of other legal systems, from
an emphasis on the strange to the familiar; from what is unique to what we have in
common. Imagine that studying foreign legal systems is like a trip to the
museum—a chance to look and marvel at the artifacts of other people. The law is
a complex artifact and thus when looking to the law of other countries, we should
not expect to find a perfect fit or coherence with our own view of law, even if the
law comes out of the same tradition or “family.” Not only do we expect that
many of the laws will be different, but we also expect that the underlying values,
principles, or theories that justify those laws will be different. On the one hand,
there would be little point to comparative law if everyone else’s laws and legal
principles were the same as ours. How interesting would a trip to the museum be
if everyone’s art, dress, or technical accomplishments were the same? Why would
one bother looking at the law of South Africa, or anywhere else, if it merely
reflected our own?
On the other hand, we also do not expect other legal systems to be
completely different, with no similarity in the sets of laws and no similarity in the
values, principles, and theories that justify those laws. We are able to learn from a
trip to the museum, in part because of the many connections, in both form and
substance, between the artifacts there and our own artifacts, both past and present.
It is not unreasonable to expect that the human condition presents many similar
challenges and problems throughout the world and that something that goes by
law is used to meet those challenges and to solve those problems. As far away
academics at Afrikaans universities. Professors McKerron and Boberg were at the
University of the Witwatersrand. Professor Burchell started his career at the University of
the Witwatersrand and then moved on to the University of Natal. He is now at the
University of Cape Town. Two of the authors of NEETHLING, Professors Neethling and
Potgeiter, are from the University of South Africa while the other, Professor Visser, is from
the University of Pretoria. Their English translator, Professor Knobel, is also from the
University of South Africa.
43. Those familiar with Zweigert and Kötz’s treatise will have read the quote from
Samuel Johnson in their preface; namely, that “[a] generous and elevated mind is
distinguished by nothing more certainly than an eminent degree of curiosity; nor is that
curiosity ever more agreeably or usefully employed, than in examining the laws and
customs of foreign nations.” ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 7, at v (quoting SAMUEL
JOHNSON, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON I, at 89 (Hill & Powell eds., Oxford 1934)).
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and as different as South Africa is, there are many more points of commonality
than there are of difference. Without these points of commonality, again there
would be little to marvel at. Rather the laws would appear as mere oddities – like
a trip to a Ripley’s “Believe it or Not.”
A. A Range of Approaches to Comparative Law
If we are looking for an exact fit, not only are we not likely to find it, but
we are also most likely missing the point of comparative law. Likewise, if we are
only looking for what is strange or different we may also be missing out on those
aspects of other people’s practices that can be fruitfully linked to aspects of our
own practices. The remainder of this section explores four different approaches to
comparative law that negotiate these issues: (1) the social evolution approach; (2)
the functionalist approach; (3) the expressivist approach; and (4) bricolage. These
approaches are explored in order to draw out lessons for those of us wishing to
engage in the study of foreign law. The next section draws from these lessons to
look more closely at South Africa’s law of delict. As will be shown, the South
African law of delict is neither too strange nor too familiar for fruitful and
interesting comparisons.
1. Social Evolution
The first approach, now long discredited, was to look at the law as a part
of social evolution, as developing in stages from the primitive to the civilized.44
With this approach, Europe and its traditions were treated as civilized and most
other traditions were treated as primitive.45 Traditions outside of Europe were
often viewed as something “other” than legal traditions. They were moral codes
or mere customs and they were often treated more as oddities than as something
worthy of serious study. At best, they were viewed as nascent, as systems that
could develop into civilized legal systems. The view was that they had little to
offer, but much to gain from the interaction with western legal systems. This 19th
Century approach to anthropology and to comparative law helped justify the
imposition of western law on the colonized people of the world. This resulted in
over half of the world falling under one or the other families of civil law and

44. See Bennett, Comparative Law, supra note 9, at 652 (referring to SIR HENRY
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) as the founding father of this approach to comparative law).
45. This included traditions as ancient and developed as the Chinese tradition. In
fact, at the extreme, this approach reserved the title of “law” to those traditions it counted
as “civilized.” Thus, the 19th and 20th century approach to China was that its system of
social order was antithetical to law. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101
MICH. L. REV. 179, 182-83 (2002).
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common law.
2. Functionalism
During the 20th century, a second approach, the functionalist approach to
anthropology and comparative law, overtook the evolutionary approach.46 The
functionalist approach is tied to modernist rationalism and views the law as
rationally serving social functions. Functionalism is based on the idea that
different societies often face similar problems and that the law is a rational
response to those problems; the law is a tool for fixing problems or meeting
societies’ needs. Different societies might construct different types of legal rules
or even different sets of legal rules to serve these purposes or to fulfill these
functions. For authors such as Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, the key to gaining
understanding through comparative work is to resist looking too narrowly for
equivalents in terms of specific causes of action or legal regulations, but to ask the
question more broadly, i.e. in terms of what laws or sets of laws fulfill similar
functions or purposes within the relevant societies.47 Then one can evaluate how
the different systems serve the given functions or purposes.48 Thus, while the
legal rules themselves might not fit our own, we might be able to identify the
same set of underlying problems that the legal rules are meant to address. The
rules might not fit, but since the problems do, we might see some value in
adopting these different sets of rules for the purposes of solving our own
problems. These other rules may be more efficient, avoid unwanted costs or
harms, or may be animated by a better or more appealing set of values.
Mixed systems, as defined above, are a product of legal transplants from
civil and common law countries. If one takes a functionalist view, then there is
little reason to be skeptical of the appropriateness of these transplants. If the
transplanted law works equally well or better to serve the functions of society,
then there is no reason to disparage it and there are perhaps good reasons to
embrace it. There is also no bar to borrowing from beyond these transplants.
Mark Tushnet, in The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,49
outlines two further approaches to comparative law;50 namely, expressionist51 and
46. Bennett, Comparative Law, supra note 9, at 652-56.
47. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 7, at 34-35.
48. Id. at 32-47.
49. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225 (1999).
50. Id. Note that while Tushnet is talking of comparative constitutional law this
article appropriates his ideas for comparative law more generally.
51. Id. at 1270 & n.214 (citing as an example of expressivist comparative
constitutional law, Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 524 (1992)). According to Tushnet, “Mary Ann Glendon has vigorously
promoted the idea that law ‘tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it and which
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bricolage.52 The expressionist approach is tied to cultural relativism or a social
constructionist position, while bricolage in the hands of Tushnet is a postmodern
approach.53
3. Expressivist
The expressivist is skeptical of transplants and borrowing. According to
Pierre Legrand, it is not merely that transplants are unwise, but rather are
impossible.54 They are impossible because statements about the law are invested
with social meaning; the law’s meaning is rooted in the culture that created it.
Thus, if one transplants the words, without transplanting the culture, the meaning
is left behind. For the expressionist, each legal system is the product of each
society’s unique culture, history and values. Not only does this view not expect
much fit in terms of the actual rules, but, perhaps more importantly, it does not see
our problems as being the same, nor our values, principles and/or sets of theories
as being the same. Thus, unless we have similar histories, values, etc., it will not
help us greatly to bring in alien legal ideas that have grown out of a particular soil
and climate and in many cases require that soil and climate to survive and/or to
thrive.55
it in turn helps to shape.’” Id. at 1269-70 (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 8 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987)).
52. Id. at 1295, 1296 n.326 (citing as an example of the bricolage approach, Kim
Lane Scheppele, Presentation at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Symposium:
Contextuality and Universality: Constitutional Borrowings on the Global Stage (Mar. 21,
1998) (analysis of Hungary's “accidental constitution.”)).
53. Id. at 1228 n.14.
54. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
& COMP. L. 111, 120-21 (1997).
55. This may have been the view of both former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia as illustrated by their dissenting opinions in Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304, 321-36
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 337-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia criticized the majority’s reliance on foreign law to determine whether
sentencing the mentally retarded to death offends evolving standards of decency and
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment. As Justice
Rehnquist stated:
I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the
punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court's
ultimate determination. While it is true that some of our prior opinions
have looked to “the climate of international opinion,” . . . to reinforce a
conclusion regarding evolving standards of decency . . . ; we have since
explicitly rejected the idea that the sentencing practices of other
countries could “serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment
prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our people.”
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Nonetheless, if the history, values or culture are similar, or if one wishes
to engage in an exercise of contrasting rather than comparing, then comparative
law through an expressivist lens could be very fruitful and rewarding. On the
expressivist view, the benefits of comparative law arise from coming to
understand different cultures and value systems, and of seeing completely
different ways of doing things. While there may be no direct fit expected, there
may be considerable aspirational value in seeing not only how things are done
differently in other places but also in coming to see that there may be other value
systems that rival one’s own.
One can heed the insights of the expressivist and be cautious about
assuming that our histories, values, and problems are the same without falling into
the equally untenable position of assuming that our histories, values, and problems
are completely different and incompatible. Oddly enough, both the functionalist
and the expressivist approaches assume that man and womankind’s artifacts are
rational responses to their environment. In the first case, the law is a rational
response to common problems, while in the second, to a unique set of values and
problems.
4. Bricolage
A fourth approach, Bricolage, challenges the assumption of rationality
found in both functionalism and expressivism. Bricolage is named after a concept
that was originally pejorative. It was coined by the somewhat infamous Margaret
Mead to describe how the people of New Guinea would simply appropriate
elements of culture from anything at hand with no real discrimination or rational
integration into a coherent framework.56 Bricolage is not concerned with finding
functional equivalents or a rationally coherent system from which laws come and
into which they go. This is because the bricoleur is skeptical about the rationality
of legal systems to begin with. Laws and legal systems are often products of
compromise, conflict, and historical accident. One need not be so caught up in the
exact place or function that a given law or set of laws served in a given context,
536 U.S. at 324-325 (internal citations omitted). Justice Scalia restated the point
in his dissent:
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of
America that we are expounding. . . . Where there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however
enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.
536 U.S. at 348 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
56. Margaret Mead, Note from New Guinea, 34 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (New Ser.)
740 (1932) (cited in Tushnet supra note 49, at 1229 n.16).
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nor in the elaborate web of values and traditions from which that law emerges.
On this view, comparative law does not involve the work of a surgeon in a heart
or kidney transplant, but something more akin to the work of an artist who creates
art out of the various objects that others discard, or which were originally intended
for radically different purposes.
Just as one can heed the insight of the expressivist without giving into
complete cultural relativism, one can heed the insights of the bricoleur without
becoming a complete skeptic. One can acknowledge these insights without
concluding that all or even that most of the law is a matter of compromise, or
accident. If we accept that our own legal system or tradition is not a closed
rational system, but one created in part by compromise, accident, and even
borrowing here and there, then there is considerable potential for the laws of other
countries to enrich our own tradition.
B. South African Delict is not too Strange or Unique to Fruitfully Compare
with the U.S. Law of Torts
Leaving the evolutionary approach aside, and heeding the lessons from
expressivism, South African law in general and the law of delict, in particular, is
not radically different from our own. Nonetheless, during the Apartheid years one
could find little to no positive references to the South African law of delict in the
U.S. or in other common law countries. This motivated Peter Kutner to publish an
article on the top ten “tort” cases from the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of South Africa during the 1980s.57 That piece focused on the contribution
made by South African courts to the development of the “common law”—that
is—to the body of law founded upon the common law of England. Kutner
convincingly argued that since 1910, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of South Africa had made significant contributions to the common law, yet to that
day (the early 1990s) those contributions had gone unnoticed by common law
jurisdictions.
Although language barriers were partially to blame,58 the main reasons
for neglecting South African law involved the perception that it was tainted by
Roman-Dutch law and by Apartheid, which made it both difficult and unseemly to
turn to South Africa for comparisons.59 As noted above, when the English came
57. Kutner, supra note 39.
58. There was, and remains, a small but significant number of cases reported in
Afrikaans, about five percent or so over the last 10 years in the area of delict. Nonetheless,
most cases are now translated into English and many Afrikaans speaking academics are
publishing in English. For instance, NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, was originally
written in Afrikaans as DELIKTEREG. See NEETHLING ET AL., DELIKTEREG (Butterworths
1989).
59. As I wrote elsewhere, no one wants to look to the rotten apple for lessons on how
to develop or perfect the common law. Roederer, Democracy, supra note 6, at 458.
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in the late 1700s they did not seek to impose English common law on the territory
of South Africa. Nonetheless, over time, as more and more lawyers, judges, and
even academics arrived with English legal training, it was inevitable that the
common law would make its mark on the Roman-Dutch law of delict.60 This was
particularly true up to the time of Apartheid. As Kutner states:
[O]ne will find that the common law has had much influence
upon the development of South African law and that the legal
principles, or media concludendi, of the cases are similar to the
principles or methods of decision found in common law
jurisdictions. For this reason, many of the reported cases in
South African courts form part of the body of common law, even
when they purport to apply and elaborate Roman-Dutch law.61
With the advent of Apartheid in the late 1940s also came a backlash
against the English influence.62 As D. Visser notes, “The bellum juridicum [the
battle over the nature or the soul of the South African legal system] was probably
most hard-fought in the area of tort.”63 The backlash against the English influence
60. A distorted version of the Westminster constitutional system was eventually
established, with an English based court system. “For the most part, its system of courts
and procedural law dates from the Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1832, which grafted
institutions and methods of adjudication characteristic of the English common law onto a
substantive law with deep roots in continental European civil law.” Francois Du Bois &
Daniel Visser, The Influence of Foreign Law in South Africa, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 593, 594 (2003) (citing H.J. Erasmus, The Interaction of Substantive and
Procedural Law: The Southern African Experience in Historical and Comparative
Perspective, 1 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 348 (1990)). Thus, English law heavily influenced
constitutional law and administrative law. English law also had a considerable influence
over certain statutory areas of the law, particularly those related to commercial law,
negotiable instruments, bankruptcy, maritime law, insurance, and partnership law.
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 7, at 233. In fact, the English statutes were borrowed nearly
verbatim. Id. Property law, succession, and family law were not heavily influenced by the
English common law. Id. at 234. Private law areas, such as contract and delict, were not
supposed to be affected, but they were. R.G. McKerron, in particular, was responsible for
viewing delict through the lens of the common law of tort. MCKERRON, supra note 42.
61. Kutner, supra note 58, at 311.
62. The “purist” backlash to rid Roman-Dutch law of the English influence is
associated with the ascendancy of L.C. Steyn to the position of Chief Justice of the
Appellate Division from 1959 to 1971. Eduard Fagan, Roman-Dutch Law in its South
African Historical Context, in SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH
AFRICA 33, 60-64 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser eds., 1996); see also William
Tetley, Mixed jurisdictions: Common law vs civil law (codified and uncodified) (Part I), 4
UNIF.
L.
REV.
592
(1999),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/1999-3.htm (last visited Apr.
4, 2009).
63. Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L.
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was part of a broader Afrikaner nationalist and expressivist movement. The
Afrikaner national government, along with judges and academics sought a return
to its Roman-Dutch roots. The policy during that era was one of segregation and
“purification.” The Apartheid regime sought, not only to place black South
Africans on separate lands, but also under separate governance and legal
authority.64 At the same time, a number of judges and academics sought to purify
or cleanse South Africa’s common law of its English influence. Edwin Cameron
went so far as to declare, “On a broad view it is fair to say . . . that what the
National Party Government sought to attain in terms of racial exclusivity and
purity . . . the Roman-Dutch ‘purists’ sought to achieve in respect of South
Africa’s legal system.”65
To this day, some judges and academics still attempt to purge delict of
English influences.66 One example is the attempt to purge the English notion of a
“duty of care,” which straddles and sometimes confuses the two distinct elements
in delict of wrongfulness and fault.67
REV. 41, 56 (2003) (citing P. Q. R. Boberg, Oak Tree or Acorn? - Conflicting Approaches
to Our Law of Delict, 83 S. AFR. L.J. 150, 150-75 (1966) [hereinafter Boberg, Oak Tree]);
C.F. FORSYTH, IN DANGER FOR THEIR TALENTS: A STUDY OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM 1950-1980, at 182-224 (Juta 1985); A.S.
Mathews & J.R.L. Milton, An English Backlash?, 82 S. AFR. L.J. 31 (1965); G.A. Mulligan,
Bellum Juridicum (3): Purists, Pollutionists and Pragmatists, 69 S. AFR. L.J. 25, 28-29
(1952); Proculus, Bellum Juridicum: Two Approaches to South African Law, 68 S. AFR.
L.J. 306, 311 (1951); Proculus, Redivivus, South African Law at the Crossroads or What Is
Our Common Law?, 82 S. AFR. L.J. 17 (1965); Adrienne van Blerk, The genesis of the
"modernist"--"purist" debate: A historical bird's-eye view, 47 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE
ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 255, 258-64 (1984)). Boberg has a more extensive list in his
Law of Delict. BOBERG, DELICT, supra note 42, at 27-28.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64.
65. Cameron, supra note 31, at 50.
66. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at 4 n.12 (arguing that the courts should
“follow the English ‘law of torts’ with circumspection, and only in so far as those legal
rules are reconcilable with our own law. The recent tendency of the courts to give
preference to our own delictual principles and thus to avoid the injudicious adoption of
English law, is thus to be welcomed.”). But see BOBERG, DELICT, supra note 42, at 26-27.
67. A recent South African Law Commission Report corrects R.G. McKerron's use
of the notion of a “duty of care” in MCKERRON, supra note 43, at 276 and applied by Da
Silva v Coutinho 1971 (3) SA 123 (A) (S. Afr.) (Jansen, JA), by noting that the use of the
term “legal duty” “is more consistent with the contemporary approach to the distinction
between unlawfulness and fault.” SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION PROJECT NO.
96, REPORT: THE APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES ACT 34 OF 1956, at 28 (2003). See also
NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at 149 where the authors state:
The duty of care approach is foreign to the principles of Roman-Dutch
law which form the basis of our law of delict. From a historical point of
view the application of these principles must be rejected. An even more
important reason to reject the application of a duty of care in our law is
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Although the result of this ongoing battle sometimes leads to doctrinal
confusion,68 for the most part, the law of delict in South Africa is coherent; it is
mixed without being mixed up.69 Even if the English and Roman-Dutch
approaches to this area of the law were at one time distinct and perhaps even
divergent in the results they would produce, those differences have been largely
ironed out over numerous years of blended application of the law to the facts of
individual cases.70 Some have gone as far as to say that “the development of the
that it is an unnecessary and roundabout way of establishing that which
may be established directly by means of the reasonable person test . . . .
Moreover, the use of the duty of care doctrine may confuse the test for
wrongfulness (breach of a legal duty) with the test for negligence.
68. See Christopher T. Roederer & James Grant, Law of Delict, 2003 ANN. SURV. S.
AFR. L. 297, 313-18, 344-46 (criticizing the decision of Lewis, JA in Premier, Western
Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd. 2003 (6) SA 13 (SCA) (S. Afr.), for her
confusing use of tort concepts when conducting the analysis of the case under wrongfulness
and fault (legal duty and breach of the legal duty)).
69. Paul Farlam & Reinhard Zimmermann, The Republic of South Africa: South
Africa (Report 1), in PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 8, at 83, note that although
historically jurists have been divided between purists, pollutionists, and pragmatists, the
current approach by jurists to the nature and sources of South African law is pragmatic. Id.
at 133. They note that the primary sources are legislation and precedent, and “beyond these
formal sources, English and Roman-Dutch law carry about equal weight.” Id. C. G. Van
der Merwe et al., The Republic of South Africa: South Africa (Report 2), in PALMER, MIXED
JURISDICTIONS, supra note 8, at 145, note that the term pollutionist is pejorative as is the
term antiquarian, which is sometimes used instead of purist. Id. at 196.
70. See, e.g., NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 43, at 4 n.12 (noting that until recently,
the English law of torts exercised a very strong influence on the law of delict in South
Africa (citing N.J. VAN DER MERWE & P.J.J. OLIVIER, DIE ONREGMATIGE DAAD IN DIE SUIDAFRIKAANSE REG 20-21 (6th ed. 1989)) and that at times the casuistic (or case by case)
nature of the English law of torts has blended in nicely with the more general principles of
Roman-Dutch delict creating a harmonious unity). Also note that in the area of unlawful
competition the courts almost wholeheartedly adopted English Tort law. Id. Most every
important case in the law of delict includes a comparative survey of common law decisions.
The opinion written by Justice Nugent in Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden
2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (S. Afr.), is an excellent example of the use of comparative
common law. This case involved the issue of state liability for the failure to take
appropriate action to protect its citizenry. Id. at 437. Justice Nugent provided a highly
informative tour of English, Australian, and New Zealand law on the topic. Id. at 442-44;
see also Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus 2001 (3) SA 868 (SCA) 874-75 (S. Afr.)
(Scott JA turning to the law of England and the U.S.A. to support his argument that actual
control was not a requirement in vicarious liability cases); Costa da Oura Rest. (Pty) Ltd.
t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA) at 41 (S. Afr.) (Olivier, JA)
(finding the case most on point was a 1949 Australian case, Deatons (Pty) Ltd. v. Flew
(1949) 79 C.L.R. 370 ¶ 6 (Austl.)). The court in Bezuidenhout NO v. ESCOM 2003 (3) SA
83 (SCA) (S. Afr.), revisited a case directly on point from the 1950s. Id. at 88. In
approaching that case and in rendering its decision the court noted and addressed the
considerable criticism of the judgment and its principles, both in South Africa and abroad.
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South African law of delict/tort often, although by no means always, followed the
developments in England.”71
Even though the common law of South Africa is primarily rooted in
Roman-Dutch law, the Roman-Dutch counterpart to torts, delict, deals with much
of the same terrain as the English common law of tort. In oversimplified form, the
law of delict consists of private or civil actions (not founded in equity, contract,
family law, or the law of property) for damage to one’s body, property, and
reputation (as well as dignity, privacy, and other rights) that are wrongfully caused
by a defendant with capacity and usually with the requirement of some degree of
fault. The elements of a delict include: wrongfulness (or unlawfulness which is
roughly equivalent to the notion of a legal duty);72 generally some form of fault
(e.g. negligence or the unreasonable breach of a duty); causation and legal
Id. at 88-94. The court took on the criticism and contrary decision in the U.S. and U.K.
(arguing that they were confused), and finished by drawing attention to the number of cases
following the principle of the court’s earlier decision in the U.S., England, and even in
Germany. Id. at 95-96. The concurring opinion of Howie, JA in that case was based in the
reasoning of P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1967). Id. at 96-97.
See also Premier, W. Cape v Faircape Prop. Developers (Pty) Ltd. 2003 (6) SA 13 (SCA)
at 30 (S. Afr.) (Lewis, JA turning to JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 18 (4th ed.) for
the inquiry into wrongfulness); Fose v Minister of Safety & Sec. 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) (S.
Afr.) (reviewing the practice of ten different jurisdictions with regard to the awarding of
“constitutional punitive” damages).
71. Visser, supra note 63, at 60 (citing REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW,
CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY 126-28 (2001)).
Even if this is slightly exaggerated one study of the number of references to foreign
authority in the 1979 law reports by Edwin Cameron and Van Zyl Smit:
found 193 references to English and Privy Council decisions, 21 to
Commonwealth judgments and 11 to American judgments. These
references came in 99 of the 684 reported cases (almost 1 in 7). On
the other hand, they found references to Roman or Roman Dutch
materials in only 39 of the reported cases.
Kate O’Regan, The Best of Both Worlds? Some Reflections on the Interaction Between the
Common Law and the Bill of Rights in Our New Constitution, 1999 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC.
L.J. 1, 5 n.8 (citing Edwin Cameron & Dirk van Zyl Smit, Adminstration of Justice, Law
Reform and Jurisprudence, 1979 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 511, 538). O’Regan also notes that
Daniel Visser found similar results in 1985. Id. at 4 n.6 (citing Daniel Visser, Daedalus in
the Supreme Court - the Common Law Today, 49 J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L. 127
(1985).
72. There is a good deal of debate in South Africa over whether these concepts are
different or the same. Much of the debate in Visser, supra note 63, addressed this issue.
While there may have been historical differences, recent scholarship tends to show that
there really are no major differences. Visser, supra note 63, at 56-57. Professor Visser
notes that when South African courts gave content to the element of wrongfulness in delict
they drew on policy arguments developed in English cases dealing with the element of
duty. Id at 60.
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causation; as well as cognizable harm or damage.73 This is quite similar to the
standard formulation in the U.S. for a negligence claim.74 Those elements are: the
defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care;75 the defendant unreasonably breaches
the duty of care (fault) causing an unreasonable risk; the defendant’s breach is the
cause in fact and the proximate cause (often referred to as legal cause in South
Africa) of the harm to the plaintiff; and the harm is legally recognized.76
Although there are many differences between the law of torts and
delict,77 the similarity between the two can be illustrated by a look at the law of
negligence in the U.S. and South Africa. Drawing out these similarities should
help provide a basis for understanding the differences that will be addressed in the
next section, as well as for understanding the differences in how the law in these
two countries is developing, or “working itself pure.” The final section below
demonstrates that the overall trajectories of the two countries are diverging
significantly. While South Africa’s law of delict is developing and working itself
pure by drawing from South Africa’s fountain of justice, namely the spirit, purport
and objects of its bill of rights, U.S. tort law has been regressing over the last 20
years or so, largely due to a wave of regressive legislative tort reforms.78

73. See NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at Part II. See also id. at Part III
(addressing a number of specific actions with slightly different elements).
74. Sometimes it is formulated as having four elements and sometimes as having
five, but in either case, the elements are the same. Richard Epstein’s formulation has only
four elements because factual causation and legal causation are listed as one element.
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS 109-110 (1999). DAN B. DOBB, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2000)
has five elements because legal causation and factual causation are listed separately.
75. There has been some level of controversy over the absence of the duty element in
the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts. John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have taken
the drafters to task for failing to replicate the standard four element test and, in particular,
for failing to include the element of duty. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657
(2001). This sparked what W. Jonathan Cardi and Michael D. Green have termed the “duty
war.” W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty War, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 (2008).
The scholarship through which the combatants are sparring includes the above cited work
as well as Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265
(2006) and John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending
to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (2006).
76. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 114.
77. Some South African Scholars argue that delict is governed by general principles
or requirements while common law torts consists of several different tort law actions. See,
e.g., Van der Merwe, supra note 69, at 181-82.
78. Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The CounterRevolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 684-702 (2008) [hereinafter Roederer, Tort Law in
America].
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1. The Standards for Negligence: Similar, but not Quite the Same
A brief analysis of the law of negligence reveals that although the
terminology is somewhat different, the legal framework is virtually the same.
While common law systems, including the U.S., use the reasonable man, now
reasonable person standard, those following the civil law traditions, including
South Africa, use the notion of a diligens paterfamilias. The “diligent patron of
the family” standard is now completely interchangeable with that of the
reasonable person standard in South Africa.79 While in both countries these
standards are objective, they are relativized, or made subjective in both countries
with the addition of certain qualifiers. In South Africa, the test is generally
articulated as the reasonable person in the position of the defendant.80 In the U.S.,
doctors and other professionals are expected to act as a reasonable doctor or
professional rather than as the reasonable layperson and those with physical
challenges are expected to act with the care that a reasonable person with that
challenge would act.81
In both systems, the test for negligence involves more than the
reasonable foreseeability of harm. It requires that a reasonable person would take
steps to avoid causing the harm. The test in South Africa was articulated by South
Africa’s Justice Holmes in Kruger v. Coetzee.82 The Holmes test asks “whether
the reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have foreseen the
reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another and causing him patrimonial
loss; and, if so, whether the reasonable person would have taken steps to guard
against the occurrence of harm.”83 In the U.S., the second part of the Holmes test
is sometimes answered using the Learned Hand test from United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.,84 which only applies liability if the probability of harm multiplied by
the degree of harm outweighs the burden on the defendant to avoid the harm.85
79. See, e.g., NEETHLING, ET AL., supra note 42, at 128-129.
80. See, e.g., id. at 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005), defines negligence as: “[a] Person acts
negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.”
81. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 118.
82. 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.).
83. Minister of Safety & Sec. v Mohofe 2007 (4) SA 215 (SCA) at 218 (S. Afr.)
(Lewis, J.) (citing Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430 (S. Afr.)) (emphasis in
original),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtofappeal.gov.za/judgments/sca_2007/sca07-021.pdf.
84. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (1947).
85. Id. at 173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 80, adopts something
very similar to the Hand formula when it specifies the primary factors for determining
negligence, as it states: “[p]rimary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will
result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.” Id. § 3. The authors of the
Restatement justify this approach in the Reporter’s Note, Comment (d) by noting that
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South African courts routinely balance these three factors, but they rarely
articulate the standard as one of a mere cost-benefit analysis. Justice Oliver
Schreiner’s approach in Herschel v Mrupe is illustrative:
No doubt there are many cases where once harm is foreseen it
must be obvious to the reasonable man that he ought to take
appropriate avoiding action. But the circumstances may be such
that a reasonable man would foresee the possibility of harm but
would nevertheless consider that the slightness of the chance that
the risk would turn into actual harm, correlated with the probable
lack of seriousness if it did, would require no precautionary
action on his part. Apart from the cost or difficulty of taking
precautions, which may be a factor to be considered by the
reasonable man, there are two variables, the seriousness of the
harm and the chances of its happening. If the harm would
probably be serious if it happened, the reasonable man would
guard against it unless the chances of its happening were very
slight. If, on the other hand, the harm, if it happened, would
probably be trivial the reasonable man might not guard against
it, even if the chances of its happening were fair or substantial.86
Thus, while South African courts balance the cost to the defendant with
the risk of harm and severity of harm, these factors are all weighed to determine
what a reasonable person would do in that situation. What a reasonable person
would do is not equated with what a rational individual who wanted to maximize
her or his utility, welfare, or economic well-being would do.87 Jurisdictions
“[l]eading torts treatises support the balancing approach to negligence. Id. § 3 rep. cmt. d;
DOBBS, supra note 74, §§ 144-46; 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR., & OSCAR S.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.9 466–482 (2d ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984). The approach is also highlighted in
almost every torts casebook, most of which use Judge Hand's opinion in Carroll Towing as
a central case. E.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 44 (8th ed. 2006); ROBERT E. KEETON ET
AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW 10, 155 (3d ed. 1998).
86. 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) at 477 (S. Afr.), quoted in Mohofe SCA 21, at ¶ 12 (Lewis,
JA). Sometimes the court articulates four factors to balance: the nature and extent of the
risk, the seriousness of the damage, the importance or utility of the wrongdoer’s conduct or
activity and the cost or difficulty of taking precautions. See NEETHLING ET AL., supra note
42, at 142-144. See also J.C. VAN DER WALT & J. R. MIDLEY, DELICT: PRINCIPLES AND
CASES 144 (3rd ed., Durban; Butterworths 1997); Pretoria City Council v De Jager 1997
(2) SA 46 (A) at 55-56 (S. Afr.).
87. Kenneth W. Simons argues that although the drafters of the Draft Restatement
(Third) of Torts adopted the Hand formula, that formula can accommodate values of
fairness in addition to the value of efficiency. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula
in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency
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within the U.S. have a mixed record of adopting the Hand formula and at least one
commentator has questioned whether juries in the U.S. actually apply the standard
at all.88 In fact, punitive damages have been awarded in cases where defendants
put lives at risk based on a crass Hand-type cost-benefit analysis.89
No treatment of negligence in the U.S. would be complete without
addressing the abstract and relative approaches to negligence as formulated in the
case of Palsgraf.90 The courts in South Africa are divided on the test for
negligence in much the same way that we are in the U.S.91 One test, the relative
Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 902 (2001). Nonetheless, he goes on to argue that the way
the Draft is worded could lead people to reduce the Hand formulation to a purely economic
efficiency balancing. As a remedy, he proposes that the Hand formula be revised to
“employ the language of ‘socially recognized advantages and disadvantages’ as a signal
that social judgments about policy and principle are critical.” Id. at 925. He goes on to
argue that the commentary should state that there is “need for the decisionmakers to make
value judgments” and that these should be articulated on a case by case basis. Id. at 92526.
88. Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in
Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 648-49 (2003). The Second Restatement formulated the
balancing somewhat differently:
[t]he judgment which is necessary to decide whether the risk so realized
is unreasonable, is that which is necessary to determine whether the
magnitude of the risk outweighs the value which the law attaches to the
conduct which involves it. This requires not only that the actor give to
the respective interests concerned the value which the law attaches to
them, but also that he give an impartial consideration to the harm likely
to be done the interests of the other as compared with the advantages
likely to accrue to his own interests, free from the natural tendency of
the actor, as a party concerned, to prefer his own interests to those of
others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, cmt. e. The authors of the Third Restatement cite
this Comment in support of their own formulation. However, the two formulations
significantly differ. The Second Restatement formula places the heavy weight of what
“value which the law attaches to the conduct” on the scale, while the Draft Third
Restatement does not put this on the scale.
89. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
90. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
91. Compare Sea Harvest Corp. (Pty) & Another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty)
Ltd. & Another 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA) at 839-40 (S. Afr.) (Scott, JA) (using the relative
approach to negligence) with id. at 846 (Streicher, JA, concurring) (using the abstract
approach). Note that Justice Scott did not argue that he was compelled to adopt the relative
approach, as he stated:
Whether one adopts a formula which is said to reflect the abstract
theory of negligence or some other formula there must always be, I
think, a measure of flexibility to accommodate the ‘grey area’ case. . . .
Inevitably the answer [to the question of what test is to be used] will
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test, follows Justice Cardozo’s approach in Palsgraf92 and limits liability to
foreseeable plaintiffs.93 On this test, the duty to act reasonably is relative or
relational in that it only applies between defendants and reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs. In South Africa, this approach does not require a subsequent legal
causation analysis. The other approach, the abstract approach, follows Justice
Andrews’ approach in his dissenting opinion in Palsgraf.94 This is referred to as
the abstract approach because the duty to act reasonably is not relative to
foreseeable plaintiffs or foreseeable harms, but is an abstract duty to act
reasonably. In cases where the courts adopt this approach, they also engage in a
legal causation analysis.95 The legal causation analysis in South Africa goes well
beyond foreseeability of harm, remoteness, direct cause, adequate cause, and lack
of a novus actus interveniens. It involves an “all things considered” policy
analysis designed to ensure that the court does not impose liability for harms that
are too remote, that are unforeseeable or where it would be unreasonable, unfair,
or unjust to hold one liable for the result.96
In South Africa, one can find cases at the Supreme Court of Appeal level
where a majority of the court adopts one or the other approach, or that contain a
concurring opinion that arrives at the same result using the other test.97 In at least
one case, the Supreme Court of Appeal used the relative approach and conducted
a legal causation analysis.98 This gave the defendant two opportunities to limit its
liability and was a mistake.
only emerge from a close consideration of the facts of each case and
ultimately will have to be determined by judicial judgment.
Id. ¶ 22. Both the majority and concurrence found that the defendant was not liable for a
fire that took place at its cold storage facility as a result of fireworks landing on its roof.
The majority’s decision was based on finding that a fire of this type was not reasonably
foreseeable, while the concurrence’s decision was based on a finding that the harm was not
legally caused by the defendant because the harm was too remote.
92. 162 N.E. 99 (joined by Pound, Lehman, & Kellogg, JJ.). While it is common to
view this as the foreseeability test under legal causation in U.S. law, in South Africa it is
viewed as a more strict negligence analysis which requires that the actual type and manner
of the harm be foreseeable. In South Africa, it obviates the need for a proximate causation
analysis. In the U.S., most jurisdictions follow the Andrews abstract approach when it
comes to negligence, but they couple this with a legal causation analysis that effectively
brings back in the Cordozo analysis.
93. This test is supported by both BOBERG, DELICT, supra note 43, at 276-77 and
NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at 139-40, and was followed in Sea Harvest Corp. (1) SA
827. See Ablort-Morgan v Whyte Bank Farms (Pty) Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 531 (E) (S. Afr.).
94. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102-104 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (joined by Crane &
O’Brien, JJ.).
95. See, e.g., Botes v Van Deventer 1966 (3) SA 182 (A) (S. Afr.); Groenewald v
Groenewald 1998 (2) SA 1106 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
96. See, e.g., NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at 187.
97. See Sea Harvest Corp. (1) SA 827.
98. Mukheiber v Raath 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
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III. DIFFERENCES DURING APARTHEID: THE NEED FOR
HARMONIZATION AND HORIZONTAL APPLICATION
As noted in the introduction, during the time of Apartheid, South African
law in general, and the law of delict in particular, was not developing to meet the
needs of the majority of South Africans. The overall system was blind to justice
and thus there was little guidance for working the common law pure. Rather, the
dominant private law theme (at least with regards to contracts and delict) was to
allow the invisible hand of the market to dominate. During roughly the same
period, tort law in the U.S. was developing to meet the needs of the people.
During the 1960s and 1970s, tort law in the U.S. was reformed through the
development of a number of mechanisms, including class actions, strict
liability/products liability, related doctrines like res ipsa loquitur, punitive
damages, contingency fees (as opposed to loser-pay-costs awards), and consumer
protection laws.99 These mechanisms were made possible, in part, by democratic
progress during that period and these developments helped secure the benefits of
democratic progress by making it much easier for the average person to obtain
justice through the tort system.100 South Africa did not draw from any of these
potential developments during the Apartheid era.101 It was only after the end of
Apartheid that there was any serious development in these areas.102 Although
tracing all of those developments is beyond the scope of this article,103 the final
section below will highlight some of those developments by way of illustrating
how South Africa is developing its common law in light of the spirit, purport, and
objects of its Bill of Rights.
One problem with Apartheid was that there was very little faith in the
system of “justice” or in the impartiality of the judiciary.104 At the end of
99. See Roederer, Tort Law in America, supra note 78, at 683-84.
100. Id.
101. For a thorough treatment of the developments that took place in the U.S. during
this period, but were not followed in South Africa, see Roederer, Democracy, supra note 6,
at 484-96. Note, however, that South Africa did follow the English statutory development
of apportioning damages according to the degree of fault in relation to the damage caused.
See Van der Merwe, supra note 69, at 183. Van der Merwe notes that the South African
Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 followed the English Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945 to get rid of the all or nothing rule and the “last
opportunity rule.” Id. Although it can be maintained that South African delict was
generally in line with English tort law, even during Apartheid, the U.K. had a number of
social safety nets in place during the post WWII era that lessened the need for tort reform.
For example: the 1944 Butler Act, which reformed schooling; the Family Allowance Act of
1945; National Health Service Act 1946 (revised in 1948), and the 1946 National Insurance
Act. See, e.g., Frank Field, The Welfare State - Never Ending Reform, BBC, Aug. 9, 1999,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/field_01.shtml.
102. See Roederer, Democracy, supra note 6, at 484-96.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH,
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Apartheid, the new government did not institute a purging of officials and judges
from the prior regime.105 They did not dismantle the existing system of “justice,”
but chose to augment it. The transition from Apartheid rule to democratic rule
was negotiated, and as part of that negotiation, the parties agreed on an Interim
Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, which would last until a democratically elected
parliament could draft a Final Constitution.106 One of the most significant
developments in the Interim Constitution was the creation of a new court, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa. The new Court was a compromise between
keeping things the same and completely revamping the system of justice. Under
the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court had exclusive and final
jurisdiction over constitutional matters, while the Appellate Division had final
jurisdiction over all non-constitutional matters.107 The Interim Constitution’s
division of labor meant that, for the most part, private law matters would fall
under the purview of the Appellate Division, while public law matters would fall
under the Constitutional Court.

RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID ORDER 154-158 (1998).
105. The sunset clauses were agreed to by the African National Conference during the
negotiations with the National Party in order to bring about a peaceful constitutional
revolution in between 1992 and 1993. See, e.g., ZIYAD MOTALA & CYRIL RAMAPHOSA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002); Heinz Klug, Participating in the
Design: Constitution-making in South Africa, in P. ANDREWS & S. ELLMAN, 128, 140-141
(2001). The sunset clauses allowed for power sharing between the African National
Congress and the National Party for a period of five years after the first democratic
election.
106. The parties also agreed to 34 principles that would guide the drafting of the Final
Constitution. These were placed in Schedule 4 to the Interim Constitution. The Interim
Constitution specified that the draft final constitution would need to be certified by the
Constitutional Court as being consistent with the 34 principles in order to become the Final
Constitution. The first draft was rejected in part as being inconsistent with a number of the
principles in the first Certification Judgment. Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional
Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4)
SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.). The second draft was accepted by the Court in Certification of the
Amended Text of the Constitution of The Republic of South Africa (S. Afr.); 1997 (2) SA 97
(CC) (S. Afr.). See Carmel Rickard, The Certification of the Constitution of South Africa,
in ANDREWS & ELLMANN, supra note 105, at 224, 286.
107. Patric Mzolisi Mtshaulana, The History and Role of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, in ANDREWS & ELLMANN, supra note 105, at 525, 535. Under the Final
Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, South Africa moved to the U.S. model and gave all High
Courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeal jurisdiction over constitutional matters,
unless they were specifically limited to the Constitutional Court under section 167(4). S.
AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, §§ 167(4), 168(3). Under section 167(3), the Constitutional Court
can only hear constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions on constitutional
matters, but it is the final arbiter of what constitutes a constitutional matter and it is the
highest court on all constitutional matters. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167(3)(a)-(c).

Working the Common Law Pure

457

Under the Final Constitution, the Appellate Division was renamed the
Supreme Court of Appeal,108 and the High Courts and the Supreme Court of
Appeal were given jurisdiction over all but a few constitutional matters reserved
for the Constitutional Court.109
As the Constitutional Court held in
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re: ex parte President of the
Republic of South Africa & Others,
There are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same
subject-matter, each having similar requirements, each operating
in its own field with its highest court. There is only one system
of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme
law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force
from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.110
Even after the Final Constitution came into effect and the Court
announced that the public law/private law divide was dissolved, the practice of
separating these areas of law continued.111 During the first five years after the
official end of Apartheid, there were sweeping changes in constitutional and
administrative law, but it is fair to say that there were not wholesale sweeping
changes to common law areas of the law, such as torts or contracts. No one sat
down and proposed a civil law code for the law of obligations (contract, delict,
and unjust enrichment).112 This is not to say that the drafters of the Final
Constitution did not envision changes in this area. However, rather than adopting
wholesale change (civil law codification style), they adopted a set of mechanisms
that would allow for the common law to develop incrementally and to be brought
in line with the Constitution and its values over time.
Before celebrating these mechanisms for harmonizing the common law
with the Constitution and its values, it is worth asking whether harmonization is
really appropriate, necessary, or desirable. The answer to these questions depends
in part on what one’s constitution is meant to constitute and whether other areas of
the law function well enough without harmonization. In this section I will survey
a few constitutional models, namely the pre-liberal Westminster model, the liberal
U.S. model, and the post-liberal South African model. Then I will demonstrate
the need and desirability of some level of harmonization between the common law
and constitution under the U.S. model. Finally, I will demonstrate the relatively

108. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, §§ 166, 168.
109. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, §§ 168-169. Matters reserved for the Constitutional
Court can be found in section 167(4).
110. 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at 696 (S. Afr.).
111. To this day, many law schools in South Africa still have separate departments for
private law and public law.
112. In civil law countries, contract, delict and unjust enrichment are often grouped
under the general heading of the law of obligations.
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greater need and desirability of harmonization in the South African case under its
constitutional model.
For the bulk of South Africa’s history, its constitutions followed a
distorted version of the British Westminster model;113 the role of these
constitutions was to constitute the organs of state.114 Constitutional law, on this
model, is primarily concerned with the power and authority of the various
branches of government.115 The model as applied in South Africa resulted in
parliamentary supremacy, with no Bill of Rights and no judicial review. Although
South Africa had constitutions, they generally could be amended by normal
majority vote,116 and the judiciary could only review laws that were inconsistent
with the Constitution on procedural grounds, and not because they violated
“rights.”117 This model is pre-liberal as it provides little to no protection for
individual liberty.
113. These models were truncated because, until the 1983 Constitution, non-whites
could not vote. Although the 1983 Tri-Cameral Constitution allowed for representation of
coloreds and Indians, these representatives were still outweighed by the white
representatives. S. AFR. CONST. 1983. In other words, the representation here was largely a
facade.
114. South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 9 (Eng.), Constitution Act 32 of 1961, and
S. AFR. CONST. 1983 (introducing the Tri-Cameral parliament) were all based on the British
model of parliamentary supremacy.
115. Of course, even the British had the Magna Carta (1215) and the English Bill of
Rights (1689). The rights recognized in these documents included habeas corpus, freedom
from Monarchial interference with the law, freedom of speech in parliament, the right to
non-interference in the election of parliament, the right to bear arms, freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment and excessive bail, freedom from taxation through royal
prerogative, freedom from the standing army in times of peace, and freedom from fine or
forfeiture without trial. Note, that many of these “rights” concerned the rights of
parliament and/or parliamentarians vis-à-vis the Crown.
116. Some sections of the 1909 Union Constitution were entrenched and required
special procedures. Section 152 of the 1909 Union Constitution provided that “Parliament
may, by law, repeal or alter any of the provisions of this Act.” However, under section
152, the repeal or alteration of the provisions of sections 35 (protecting the non-white
franchise in the Cape Province), 137 (protecting the equality of both Dutch and English as
official languages), and 152 (the Entrenchment Clause) required passage by both Houses of
Parliament sitting together and agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total number of
members of both Houses. The National Party attempted to repeal section 35 without going
through the correct procedure; this was struck down in Harris & Others v Minister of the
Interior & Another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.). The requisite vote was later met and the
repeal was upheld in Collins v Minister of the Interior & Another 1957 (1) SA 552 (A) (S.
Afr.).
117. In Brown v Leyds NO 1897 (4) Eng. Reports (17) (S.C.) (S. Afr.), Chief Justice
Koetze of the Transvaal tried to follow in Justice Marshall’s footsteps and introduce
American style judicial review (case involving an American mining engineer who claimed
damages arising out of the government's failure to issue licenses for gold claims he had
staked). President Kruger responded with an emergency session of parliament and the
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The American Revolution and the U.S. Constitution were, in part,
reactions to the British constitutional model. The U.S. constitutional model was
based on classical liberal thinking, and the need to protect individual liberty from
the concentrated power of government. It was not enough to have checks and
balances between the branches. Thus, the U.S. Constitution not only constitutes
the framework for government, but it strives to “form a more perfect union.” 118
In trying to “promote the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty,” 119
the Constitution sets out rights and limits on government.
This model takes us beyond the separation of powers and checks and
balances of government to the vertical relations between the state and individuals.
On this model, public law is concerned with the relationships between the levels
and branches of government and the vertical relationships between government
and the people. As a corollary, horizontal issues between persons are to be
governed by private law, for instance contracts and torts, or delict. On this model,
private common law predates public constitutional law and has its own separate
domain.120 It is worth querying if there is any good reason for a Constitution to
break from this classical liberal mold and apply to relations between individuals.
Is there any good reason to bring traditionally private law areas in line with the
Constitution or does this simply mix apples and oranges?
If the Constitution is seen as simply one other area of law, or an
addendum to existing private law, then one might be skeptical of its reach into this
existing domain. On the one hand, this makes sense if the Constitution is a mere
contract where individuals agree to give up some of their freedom and power to
the state in exchange for the guarantee of certain liberties or rights. If, on the
other hand, the Constitution is seen as providing a comprehensive normative
system for the state and all of the law within the state, then one might want to
have harmony with that value system throughout the legal system. This latter
view makes sense if the Constitution is seen as the legal embodiment of the state
and the state is “the people” rather than “the sovereign.”
The second reason that the horizontal application of rights in a
Constitution might be desirable is if there is a real or perceived need for the
protection of individuals’ rights from both the state and other private persons. If
one is truly concerned with rights, and rights, such as the right to vote, to speak, to
associate, etc., can be put in jeopardy by individuals and corporations in much the
same way that they can be put in jeopardy by the state, then it may be desirable to
have the constitutional right go that extra mile, so to speak, and apply to these
eventual dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze. See H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE UNION
OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 107-10 (George W.
Keeton ed., Juta & Co. 1960).
118. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
119. Id.
120. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments make it clear that there are rights and powers
that pre-exist the Constitution that are not diminished by the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
amends. IX & X.
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horizontal relations. Whether there is such a need will depend on both the threats
from the private sphere and the existing actions and remedies that exist under
private law to address those threats. If private power rivals governmental power
and the existing private common law is not up to the task of protecting the
freedom, equality, and dignity of individuals, then one may want her or his
Constitution to step in and protect those rights or values.121
A. The U.S. Model
While South Africa’s previous constitutions failed to live up to even the
liberal model,122 the U.S. Constitution largely followed the classical liberal model,
at least up until the end of the Civil War. Although as a general rule, the U.S.
model still follows the classical liberal model,123 there are a number of exceptions
to this general rule. By looking at the need for horizontal application in the U.S.
case, the need, or desire for horizontal application in the South African case
should become more apparent.
Prior to the Civil War, constitutional rights were primarily rights against
the federal government. The preoccupation at the time of creating the Union was
to protect individuals, and to some degree states, from the concentrated power of
the federal government. At that time, it was thought that individuals would turn to
their state constitutions for protection from individual states. However, the
institution of slavery made it painfully clear that everyone could not count on their
state to protect their rights. Further, while the institution of slavery was made
121. South Africa’s Final Constitution also provides for positive rights, or socioeconomic rights. It is more controversial to hold a person responsible for delivering on
these rights. For a thoughtful treatment of the subject see Stephan Ellman, A Constitutional
Confluence: American ‘State Action’ Law and the Application of South Africa’s Socioeconomic Rights Guarantees to Private Actors, in ANDREWS & ELLMAN, supra note 105, at
444.
122. South Africa’s previous constitutions were truncated forms of the British
constitutional model, or the Westminster system of parliamentary supremacy. Thus, there
was no supremacy clause in previous constitutions and no judicial review. See, e.g.,
Roederer, Democracy, supra note 6, at 462 n.55.
123. Even during the heyday of classical liberalism on the bench there were strong
dissents. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (the majority invalidated New York maximum hours law for bakers on the
grounds that it interfered with freedom of contract and thereby the liberty interest protected
by the 14th Amendment; Holmes argued that “[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. . . . [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory . . . . It is made for people of fundamentally differing views”). As noted
by Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 387 (2003), just because the Bill of Rights does not bind individuals directly, does not
mean that they do not indirectly govern relations between individuals in the U.S. Id. at
388-80 (citing by example, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
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possible by state laws regarding property and contract, the state was not the
primary actor. Rather, it was individuals who bought, sold, and exploited their
fellow humans through the institution of slavery. Thus, it would make little sense
to think that the states, particularly in the South at that time, would protect the
rights of African-Americans, and it made even less sense to think that slavery and
involuntary servitude were only problematic when the government was directly
involved.
Thus with the end of the Civil War came the Civil War Amendments: the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. While the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment124 and Fifteenth Amendment125 made it clear that they
applied to the states, the Thirteenth Amendment, which provides that “[n]either
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction” applied to everyone, states and individuals
alike.126 Further, § 2 of the Amendment, which gives Congress power to enforce
the Amendment by appropriate legislation (called the “Enforcement Clause”),
gave Congress the power to enact legislation that directly regulated the conduct of
private parties. Although the Fourteenth Amendment did not itself apply to
individuals, § 5 of the Amendment, like § 2 of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, gave Congress the authority to “enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.”
Just after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 was introduced into Congress and passed some five years later. The
Civil Rights Act of 1875 is noteworthy because it attempted to apply the
Fourteenth Amendment to individuals by creating both criminal sanctions and a
private right of action for the denial of the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of
any previous condition of servitude.127
124. The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law, equal protection of the
laws, and prohibits the denial of U.S. privileges and immunities by the states. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
125. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination in the right to vote “on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
127. The introduction to the Act read:
[w]hereas it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of
all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its
dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of
whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political; and it
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Section 2 of the Act provided for a right of action and a remedy of 500 dollars for
every denial, as well as for aiding or inciting such a denial. Section 2 also
provided that these offenses would constitute misdemeanors. The legislation was
designed to protect individuals from the invasion of their rights by other
individuals. It was deemed necessary because southern states, by allowing
Caucasian citizens to discriminate in providing public accommodations, were not
providing African-Americans with “equal protection of the laws,” nor protecting
them from the “badges and incidents of slavery,” as the Amendments ostensibly
required.128
Nonetheless, these provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were struck
down as exceeding Congress’s powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases.129 Justice
Bradley, writing for the majority, held that the legislation was neither proper
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment nor under § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment.130 It failed under § 5 of the Fourteenth because the Amendment
allowed only for legislation that regulated state conduct and not private conduct,
and it failed under § 2 of the Thirteenth because the only private conduct that
could be regulated under that Section was private conduct that amounted to
slavery, involuntary servitude, or the “badges and incidents” of slavery.131
Discriminating in the provision of public accommodations fell in-between; it was
neither the state denying equal protection nor individuals practicing slavery or
involuntary servitude.
Justice Harlan wrote a powerful dissent in that case, arguing that the
Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment gave African-Americans equal
citizenship and that this required that they not be denied equal civil rights by
either the state or private persons. Alternatively, given that places of public
accommodation had always been subject to public regulation, their owners were,
in effect, agents of the state. Further, he argued that Congress was correct in its
determination that discrimination by owners of public accommodations, who were
fulfilling public or quasi-public functions, constituted a “badge of servitude.”132
It would take nearly a century before similar legislation would re-appear and
being the appropriate object of legislation to enact great fundamental
principles into law . . . .
Civil Rights Act, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
128. Congress passed a whole range of statutes during this time, including: 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1982 (Property Rights of Citizens); 1983 (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights);
1985(3) (Depriving Persons of Rights or Privileges); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241 (Conspiracy
Against Rights of Citizens); 242 (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1443 (Jurisdiction of Civil Rights Cases).
129. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This is perhaps why the drafters of these Amendments did not
provide for judges to develop common law actions to vindicate these rights.
130. Id. at 24.
131. Id. at 20-23.
132. Id. at 26-62.
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the promises of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments would be realized
through the application of the spirit of these Amendments to private persons.
Although there was some early progress in the South with newly enfranchised
black majorities,133 that progress came to a halt through violence, intimidation,
fraud, and eventual disenfranchisement.134 From the end of the Civil War up to
the 1950s, Black Codes and Jim Crow laws kept African-Americans segregated
and in a state of servitude.135 The Black Codes were written immediately after the
Civil War and were intended to continue the practice of slavery and denial of civil
rights by other means.136 The Jim Crow laws, which were passed shortly
thereafter, were passed in order to keep non-whites out of white public schools
and separated from whites in public places, on public transportation, in hotels,
inns, restrooms, and restaurants.137
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) started the
process of dismantling the Jim Crow laws, but it was the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that did the most to bring this era to an end.
According to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department, “[t]he
Voting Rights Act, adopted initially in 1965 and extended in 1970, 1975, and
1982, is generally considered the most successful piece of civil rights legislation
ever adopted by the United States Congress.”138 It actually delivered on the
133. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner note that there was considerable reconstruction
progress with regards to voting, civil rights, and education in The Tyranny of the Minority:
Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 80-83,
100-05 (2008). Nonetheless, progress in some of these areas was reversed by the end of the
century and in others by the end of the first decade of the 20th century. Id. at 83-94, 101,
104-105.
134. Id. at 80-97. In addition to violence and intimidation, other mechanisms for
depriving African-Americans the vote included poll taxes, literacy tests, criminal
disenfranchisement, and voter registration.
135. Gabriel J. Chin and Randy Wagner make the important point that in many states
in the South, African-Americans constituted a majority. Id. at 65-66, 80 (noting that “[i]n
1880, for example, African Americans were an absolute majority in Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina; and were over 40% of the population in Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
and Virginia, making African-Americans the largest single voting bloc in those states.”).
136. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 which protected the right “to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, . . .” 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982 (2006)), was passed in response to the deprivation of these rights in the
Black Codes. See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1397 (2008). The Act was passed again in 1870, after
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
137. See Olympia Duhart, A Native Son's Defense: Bigger Thomas and Diminished
Capacity, 49 HOW. L.J. 61, 65-67 (2005) (describing the pervasive nature of segregation
laws under Jim Crow).
138. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL
VOTING RIGHTS LAWS (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro.php. The Voting
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Fifteenth Amendment’s promise of enfranchising African Americans.139 The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provided statutory tort actions for discrimination in
employment, housing, education, and public accommodations on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, and religion.140 Although Congress relied in part on § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it was not upheld
under the enforcement clauses of these Amendments but under the Commerce
Clause in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964).141
The narrow approach to the Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause
from the Civil Rights Cases was not abandoned until 1968. The Court in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. revived part of the 1866 Civil Rights Act to allow a claim by
Mr. and Mrs. Jones against the Mayer Company for refusing to sell housing or
land to the couple on the basis of Mr. Jones’s race.142 The applicable section
provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”143 Although the Court in
the Civil Rights Cases interpreted the provision to be limited to acts of
discrimination under color of state law,144 the Court in Jones held that private
discrimination could constitute a badge or incident of slavery and that the
legislation authorized lawsuits for purely private discrimination.145
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court upheld a claim for damages against
private persons under § 1984(3) for conspiracies that interfered with the right to
travel.146 In this case, two white residents in Mississippi stopped the car in which
the five black plaintiffs were travelling, forced them out, and proceeded to beat
them with clubs.147
Rights Act restored the vote to African Americans.
139. The introduction goes on to state, “[t]he Act codifies and effectuates the 15th
Amendment’s permanent guarantee that, throughout the nation, no person shall be denied
the right to vote on account of race or color.” Id.
140. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000h-6 (2006).
141. 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964).
142. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
144. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883).
145. 392 U.S. at 437-44. See also id. at 441 n.78 (overturning Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which held that the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement clause
did not apply to cases not involving slavery).
146. 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971).
147. The complaint read:
On July 2, 1966 defendants, acting under a mistaken belief that R. G.
Grady was a worker for Civil Rights for Negroes, willfully and
maliciously conspired, planned, and agreed to block the passage of said
plaintiffs in said automobile upon the public highways, to stop and
detain them and to assault, beat and injure them with deadly weapons.
Their purpose was to prevent said plaintiffs and other Negro-
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In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary, the Court upheld 42 U.S.C. §
1981, prohibiting discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, in a
case involving private schools that publically advertised for applicants, yet refused
to consider or admit non-white children.148 Although the holding in Runyon was
limited by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (1989),149 which narrowly construed
§ 1981 to not apply to post contractual discrimination such as racial harassment on
the job, Congress responded by overruling Patterson with the Civil Rights Act of
1991.150
1. Conclusions from the U.S. experience
As this brief sketch demonstrates, even within the U.S. model, the case
for horizontal application in the context of racial discrimination is compelling, 151
and it would appear that by the late 1960s legislative developments had largely
brought tort liability in line with the Civil War Amendments.152
Outside of the Civil War Amendments and the few rather narrow
exceptions to the state action doctrine,153 there are only two areas of private law
Americans, through such force, violence and intimidation, from seeking
the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying the equal rights,
privileges and immunities of citizens under the laws of the United
States and the State of Mississippi, including but not limited to their
rights to freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly; their
right to petition their government for redress of their grievances; their
rights to be secure in their persons and their homes; and their rights not
to be enslaved nor deprived of life and liberty other than by due process
of law.
Id. at 90.
148. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
149. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
150. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory
Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
923, 939-40 (1993)
151. For this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to find exceptions to the state
action doctrine more readily in cases involving racial discrimination. E.g., Shelley v.
Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (involving a state’s judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants).
152. One may have wanted more, particularly earlier. For instance, although there
were some early federal affirmative action cases where legislation was upheld as being
remedial under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion), subsequent cases have rejected this view and have
held that such legislation must pass strict scrutiny, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
153. There were considerably more cases finding exceptions to the state action
doctrine (the doctrine that the Constitution only binds the state) and, thereby, applying
constitutional rights to non-state actors during the Warren Court era (1952-1969) than
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that have been explicitly harmonized with the Constitution, namely defamation
law154 and punitive damages.155 Defamation law was only brought into line with
the Constitution’s First Amendment values in 1964 in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.156 Prior to that point, defamation law was entirely a state law issue.157
Prior to Sullivan, public officials could sue in defamation for the negligent
publication of defamatory materials. The case itself was based on a suit by the
police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama against the New York Times for
publishing an advertisement soliciting funds to help Martin Luther King Jr. in his
criminal defense in Alabama. Suits like this were common and thought to be a
means for suppressing political criticism. Thus, the Court in Sullivan held that,
because of the chilling effects of the common law rule of defamation on freedom
of expression and the robust exchange of ideas and information, the Constitution
required that the rule be changed to require proof of actual malice (that the
plaintiff knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity) before the press can be sued in cases involving public officials.158
This degree of horizontal application and harmonization may appear
paltry, but that is to be expected when the Constitution itself is drafted as a liberal
Constitution. In other words, the reason there is so little harmonization is because
there is not a great deal to harmonize. Given that the Constitution was drafted on
the classical liberal model and was not designed to apply to private persons in
their relations with one another, neither the rights in the Constitution, nor its spirit,
objects, and purport are likely to help guide the development of the common law.
In fact, outside of the Civil War Amendments, the spirit and purport of the Bill of
Rights would appear to urge separate development. The Ninth and Tenth
Amendments preserve other rights and powers that are exercised and developed at
the state level and through the common law.
Although it can hardly be said that U.S. common law developed in light
of the Constitution during this period, it did develop in light of broader democratic
values. Those developments took place in the areas of consumer protection,
products liability, comparative negligence, and the expansion of duty under the
special relationships doctrine.159 These developments made it easier for average
during the Burger Court era (1969-1986) and Rehnquist Court era (1986-2005).
154. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
155. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093
(2005).
156. 376 U.S. 254.
157. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court acknowledged that prior to that point, the
Constitution did not protect libelous publications. 376 U.S. at 268 (citing Konigsberg v.
State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961)).
158. As Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous court stated, “[t]hat erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive[.]’” Id. at 27172 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963)) (alterations in original).
159. See Roederer, Tort Law in America, supra note 78, at 683-84.
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Americans to access the courts and obtain justice for the harms that they suffered.
In other words, the common law was developing to protect the individual from the
concentrated power of other persons, both corporate and natural, without the aid
of the Constitution.
B. South Africa
While democratic progress was being made in the U.S. post-WWII,
South Africa entered the period of Apartheid under National Party rule.160 Under
Apartheid rule, the government started passing legislation to systematically
separate the people of South Africa, both physically and legally. Thus, it passed
the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, which classified South Africans as
Black, Coloured, Indian, or White; the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, which
segregated cities and towns based on “racial” categories; the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act 55 of 1949 which prohibited marriage between Europeans and nonEuropeans, the Immorality Act 23 of 1957, which prohibited sexual intercourse
between races; and the Black Education Act 47 of 1953, the Indians Education
Act 60 of 1965, and the Coloureds Education Act 47 of 1963, which segregated
education for non-whites.161 The NP government also passed laws that required
non-whites to carry pass books that showed where they lived, who they worked
for, and where and when they could travel for work.162 Failure to have a passbook
or being in a place not authorized under the pass laws could result in arrest and
prosecution.
In addition to being denied the franchise, having to live on reservations
or on the outskirts of cities, and having inferior health and educational services,
the black South African worker was put at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis her or
his employer. Black workers were excluded from collective bargaining under the
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. Employers were not required to recognize
black unions. Black workers were not allowed to strike under the Bantu Labour
(Settlement of Disputes) Act 48 of 1953,163 and many skilled and semi-skilled jobs
160. This is not to say that there was no racist legislation before the National Party
came into power in 1948. Most black South Africans could not vote from the time of the
Union Constitution in 1910, and those remaining in the Cape who could vote were struck
from the role by the Representation of Natives Act of 1936. The Natives Land Act of 1913
restricted black ownership of land to 13 percent of the territory.
161. For a representative list of racist Apartheid legislation, see, e.g., Johan de Waal,
Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 58 nn. 8-11 (C.G.
Van der Merwe & Jacques E. du Plessis eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2004).
162. Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945; Natives (Abolition of
Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952; Prevention of Illegal Squatting
Act 52 of 1951.
163. MARTIN BRASSEY & GARTH ABRAHAM, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR LAW, A1:38
(Juta & Co. 1998).

468

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 26, No. 2

2009

were reserved for whites.164 The systematic racial discrimination in the workplace
was further entrenched by the absence of legislation providing for fair discipline
and dismissal of workers. Under the common law, they could be dismissed for
any reason whatsoever.
With this kind of legislation in place, it is no surprise that there was no
strict liability or progressive legislation in the area of products liability, no
provisions for class action law suits, no provision for contingency fees, much less
any civil rights laws that allowed for fee shifting.165 In South Africa, the rule was
that the loser paid the winner’s attorney fees. Should a black South African be
brave enough to bring an action to Court, she or he would find that there was a
separate table for her or his so-called “non-European” advocate.166
164. For example, jobs were reserved under the Mines and Works Act 12 of 1911 and
also the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. Id.; David Woolfrey, Presentation at the
University of Bophuthatswana Symposium: New Trends in International Law, The
Application of International Labour Norms to South African Law (1987), in 12 S. AFR.
Y.B. INT’L L. 135, 141 (1986–1987).
165. Although there are hundreds of fee-shifting statutes at the state and local level,
the most expansive fee-shifting provisions are in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 504 (2006), which makes attorney fees available to prevailing parties in a whole range of
actions against the federal government. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal
Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government
Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217 (1994). Fee-shifting statutes make an already proplaintiff fee regime even more pro-plaintiff. Note that the U.S. model, which was first
articulated in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796), under which one generally pays her
or his own legal fees, is itself based on the idea of aiding those with less resources to bring
claims. The American model gets rid of the specter of being required to pay the
defendant’s legal fees, if one should lose. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the
Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV
291, 297 (1990) (American Rule “grew out of the notion that requiring each party to pay its
own fees would increase access to the courts because impecunious plaintiffs could bring
meritorious lawsuits without fear that they would be responsible for paying opposing
counsel’s fees”); See also Martin Patrick Averill, Comment, “Specters” and “Litigious
Fog”?: The Fourth Circuit Abandons Catalyst Theory in S-1 & S-2 by and through P-1 &
P-2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2245, 2252 (1995) (the
American Rule “was originally viewed as a progressive change in the law” for this very
reason).
166. The practice of segregating the courtroom so that “non-European” practitioners
would have to represent their clients from a different table than that used by “European”
practitioners was upheld in an opinion written by Chief Justice Steyn in R v Pitje 1960 (4)
SA 709 (A) (S. Afr.). Nelson Mandela questioned the neutrality of the justice system when
defending himself in the Rivonia Treason Trials. As he stated in his argument to have the
magistrate in his case recuse himself, “I was developing the point that a judiciary controlled
entirely by whites and enforcing laws enacted by a white parliament in which we have no
representation, laws which in most cases are passed in the face of unanimous opposition
from Africans, cannot be regarded as an impartial tribunal in a political trial where an
African stands as an accused.” Black Man in White Court: Nelson Mandela’s First Court
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While it is true that the same common law applied to blacks and whites,
the common law rules were largely premised on the idea of free and equal people
interacting in a free market. As stated above, the idea of freedom of contract
prevailed. It prevailed to the extent that the Appellate division in Lillicrap,
Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros. (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd. held that “in general,
contracting parties contemplate that their contract should lay down the ambit of
their reciprocal rights and obligations. To that end, they would define, expressly
or tacitly, the nature and quality of the performance required from each party.”167
Whereas in the U.S. one can sometimes contract out of tort liability, here the
Court held that if the parties wanted to preserve delictual liability, they should
have put it in their contract.168 The Court went on to contrast the liberal British
approach to the duty of care with what it called South Africa’s conservative
approach to imposing legal duties.169
Two of the leading treatises on the South African law of delict claim that
the fundamental premise of South African law is that harm or damages rest where
they fall and that each person must bear the damage that he or she suffers. 170
Delict, as a subset of the law of obligations, is viewed as that area of law where
responsibility to pay damages for the harm is shifted to another. Delictual
liability, like liability under contract and unjust enrichment, is seen as an
exception to the general rule that one is responsible for her or his own self only.
Thus, unlike in the U.S. where there was progressive legislation to
remedy the legacies of slavery and where the common law made progressive
strides towards protecting the rights of individuals from other individual persons
and corporations, South Africa’s private common law did little to protect the
rights of the majority of South Africans from the concentrated power of white
South African individuals and corporations. Rather, up to the time of the new
constitutional dispensation, South Africa’s private common law acted to further
entrench the inequality and exploitation of the non-white population.
This lack of concern and protection for the majority of South Africans
under its private law contrasted sharply with the post-Apartheid constitutions.
Statement - 1962, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1960s/nm6210.html (last
visited May 20, 2009).
167. 1985 (1) SA 475, 500 (A) (S. Afr.).
168. Id. at 500-01.
169. Id. at 504. See also Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer
(Pty) Ltd. 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA) (S. Afr.). Recently the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed
and applied Lillicrap (1) SA 475, and held that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action for
pure economic loss resulting from a design defect in their aquariums caused by the respondents.
Justice Brand reiterated the dicta that the English approach was liberal with regards to the
extension of a duty of care, while South Africa is conservative. Id. at 147 (quoting Lillicrap (1)
SA at 504). The court saw no reason to “rescue a plaintiff who was in the position to avoid the
risk of harm by contractual means[.]” Id. at 149.
170. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at 3; VAN DER WALT & MIDLEY, supra note 86,
at 19.
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South Africa’s new constitutional era saw the full embrace of international human
rights. In fact, Makau wa Mutua has described the South African Constitution as
“the first deliberate and calculated effort in history to craft a human rights state–a
policy that is primarily animated by human rights norms.” 171
If South Africa’s new Constitution was founded merely on liberal values
and civil and political rights, there would be an argument that the private common
law of South Africa would not need to be developed in order to bring it into
harmony with its Constitution. However, the values that inform South Africa’s
Final Constitution, as contained in the Founding Provisions, the Bill of Rights,
and the Constitution as a whole, are not limited to the values of liberty or freedom
from intervention. Rather, they include the values of dignity, substantive equality,
and the elimination of discrimination. The extensive list of rights in the Bill of
Rights includes not only traditional, liberal, negative, civil, and political rights, but
also positive social, cultural, and economic rights.172
1. Conclusions from the South African Experience
As demonstrated above, Apartheid created the need to protect individuals
from other private persons and corporations and, by and large, the private
common law did not rise to the occasion. It did not develop to protect the
majority of South Africans. With the demise of Apartheid and the beginning of
the new constitutional era, and a new post-liberal transformative Constitution, this
disconnection between the Constitution and private law is unsustainable. To the
extent that slavery and post reconstruction laws in the South helped make the case
for the need to go beyond the liberal model in the U.S. case, Apartheid makes an
even more compelling case for a post-liberal Constitution which allows for the
horizontal application and the harmonization of the common law with its
fundamental values.

171. Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of
Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 (1997).
172. Chapter 2 of the Final Constitution includes substantive rights under the
following headings: Equality; Human dignity; Life; Freedom and security of the person;
Slavery, servitude and forced labour; Privacy; Freedom of religion, belief and opinion;
Freedom of expression; Assembly, demonstration, picket and petition; Freedom of
association; Political rights; Citizenship; Freedom of movement and residence; Freedom of
trade, occupation and profession; Labour relations; Environment; Property; Housing;
Health care, food, water and social security; Children; Education; Language and culture;
Cultural, religious and linguistic communities; Access to information; Just administrative
action; Access to courts; and Arrested, detained and accused persons. S. AFR. CONST. 1996,
ch. 2, §§ 7–39.
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IV. THE MECHANISMS FOR DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW OF
SOUTH AFRICA.
There are two mechanisms found in the text for bringing the common
law in line with the Constitution.173 The primary mechanism for this development
can be found in § 39(2) of the Final Constitution.174 Section 39(2) requires that,
173. As the court in S. v Thebus & Another stated, “[t]he superior courts have always
had an inherent power to refashion and develop the common law in order to reflect the
changing social, moral and economic make-up of society.” 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) ¶ 31 (S.
Afr.) (footnotes omitted). “That power is now constitutionally authorised and must be
exercised within the prescripts and ethos of the Constitution.” Id. The common law itself
has always had its own mechanism for development. For instance, contract law in South
Africa contains the notions of good faith and public policy, while delictual liability can be
expanded or contracted through the elements of wrongfulness (in South Africa this notion
is referred to as “the legal convictions of the community”), reasonableness (or negligent
breach of a duty), and legal causation (which is a mixture of foreseeability, the lack of a
novus actus interveniens, and an all-things-considered evaluation of the justice of holding
someone liable for a particular result). Under Apartheid, the primacy of the “free market”
as regulator of the private domain also meant that South Africa followed what we would
refer to as classical contract law, where freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda were
the prime public policy concerns, and “buyer beware” was the motto. It also meant that
“freedom of contract” trumped over the legal imposition of duty under the law of delict.
See Alfred Cockrell, The Hegemony of Contract, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 286, 287-89 (1998). It is
completely possible to develop the common law through these doctrines without reference
to the Constitution. For instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Media Ltd. &
Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), at 1210-11 (S. Afr.) substantially modified the
rule laid down by the Apartheid Appellate Division in Pakendorf en Andere v De
Flamingh, 1982 (3) SA 146 (A) at 156-158 (S. Afr.). Pakendorf changed the law of
defamation to provide strict liability for media defendants who published defamatory
material. Id. at 156-58. Bogoshi introduced a defense of reasonable publication for media
defense based on the idea that Pakendorf got the balance of freedom of expression and
dignity wrong on the day it was decided, not in light of the changes that took place with the
end of Apartheid. Bogoshi at 1210-11. The Court in Bogoshi did, however, go through an
interim section 35(3) analysis, which is the same as the Final Constitution’s section 39(2)
analysis, and came to the same conclusion. Id. The decision in Bogoshi was subsequently
affirmed as being consistent with a section 39(2) analysis under the final Constitution as
well as being consistent with a section 8(3) analysis. Holomisa v Khumalo & Others 2002
(3) SA 38 (T) at 68 (S. Afr.). The Constitutional Court affirmed the Holomisa decision by
using a section 8(3) analysis in Khumalo v Holomisa, 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at 424-25 (S.
Afr.). This was the first case to use section 8(2)-(3). See IAIN CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Juta & Co. Ltd. 2005) (1998) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
“It is the Constitutional Court's first (and so far only) use of the direct horizontality
provisions of the 1996 Constitution. It can be read as bringing to an end the long reign of
indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law. It holds (although admittedly
not in so many words) that the Bill of Rights must be applied directly to the common law
wherever appropriate.” Id. at 51-52.
174. As noted above, there was a similar provision in the interim Constitution. S. AFR.
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“[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.”175
This mechanism allows for what is referred to as indirect horizontal
application of the Constitution. Horizontal application is the application of the
Constitution to conduct between private persons. This can be contrasted with
vertical application. The traditional approach takes the vertical view, whereby
constitutions are seen as applying to the conduct of the state in order to protect
private persons. Section 39(2) is indirect, both because it does not apply specific
provisions of the Constitution, but rather invokes the spirit, purport, and objects of
the Bill of Rights, and because it does not directly apply itself, but rather applies
through the interpretation and development of existing laws regulating individual
conduct.
The Constitution also allows for the direct application of the Bill of
Rights to individuals under § 8(1) and (2) which provides:
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty
imposed by the right.
Contrary to § 39(2), § 8(2) allows for the direct application of the Bill of
Rights in the first sense above. It directly applies the Bill of Rights to natural and
juristic persons. However, § 8(3) stipulates that the Bill of Rights does not apply
directly in the second sense above. Section 8 (3) provides that:
When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or
juristic person in terms of subsection (2),
a) a court in order to give effect to a right in the Bill,
must apply, or if necessary develop, the common
law to the extent that legislation does not give
effect to that right; and
b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the
right, provided that the limitation is in accordance
with section 36(1).
Thus, even when the Court decides to directly apply the Bill of Rights
under § 8(2), it is called upon to do so indirectly by consulting existing law, and
then developing that law to give effect to the right or rights in question.
(Interim) CONST. § 35(3) 1993.
175. This includes S. AFR. CONST. 1996, as well as S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993.
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A. Which Approach is Better?
While some authors have consistently maintained that the direct approach
is the best approach,176 a number of South African scholars have argued that the
work of § 8 can be accomplished equally well through the § 39 approach.177
In The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights, Stu Woolman argues that the
Constitutional Court’s persistent refusal to directly apply the Bill of Rights under
§ 8, and its insistence on taking the § 39(2) approach, has resulted in the Court
engaging in flaccid, rather than rigorous analysis.178 He argues that by moving to
a vague value analysis under § 39, the Court is effectively sitting as a court of
equity, rather than a court of law; that it is undermining the Bill of Rights, rather
than giving its provisions clear content; and that it is undermining the rule of law
rather than supporting it through the development of clear rules that provide some
level of certainty for future cases.179 Woolman argues that in many recent cases,
176. See, e.g., Stuart Woolman & Dennis Davis, The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De
Klerk, Classical Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights Under the Interim
and Final Constitutions, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 361, 365 (1996) [hereinafter Woolman,
The Last Laugh]; Stu Woolman, Application, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA
31-4 to 31-5 (Stu Woolman ed., Juta & Co., Ltd. 2005) (2002) [hereinafter Woolman,
Application]; See also Stu Woolman, The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights, 124 S. AFR.
L.J. 762-794 (2007) [hereinafter Woolman, Vanishing].
177. See HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 50 (“In common law disputes between private
parties, a direct application of the Bill of Rights will seldom offer significant advantages for
a litigant over an indirect application. In most cases, a litigant will motivate for a change in
the common law and it matters little whether a court is persuaded to do so with reference to
an argument based on direct or indirect application.”); Christopher J. Roederer, Post-Matrix
Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South African Law, 19 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 57, 71 n.75 (2003). In this work, I recognized that the section 8(3) approach is
superior from the point of view of guidance to the courts as it calls attention to the
possibility that while promoting one rights or set of rights, other rights may be infringed or
limited. The section 8(3) approach directs the courts to ensure that any such limitation
passes the section 36 requirements. Section 36 requires that any infringement of a right
that takes place while developing the law to vindicate another right is “reasonable and
justifiable in an open democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”
Something like this analysis should also be done in any evaluation of the appropriateness of
the development of the common law under section 39 if that development limits other
rights. The difference under section 39 is that this limitation analysis is done through the
more fluid process of balancing the rights in order to come to the overall spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights. Another difference is that section 39(2) allows for the
development of the common law when persons are suing the state, while section 8 does not
clearly address developing the common law when applying provisions to the state. It is not
self evident that a violation of a right by the state will result in delictual liability. See, e.g.,
Zealand v Minister for Justice and & Constitutional Development & Another 2008 (4)
SA 458 (CC) ¶¶ 52-54 (S. Afr.).
178. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 763.
179. Id.
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the Constitutional Court’s use of, and approach to, § 39(2) has rendered § 8(2) and
(3) “surplusage” which contradicts the Court’s holding in Khumalo.180 In
Khumalo, Justice O’Regan held that one could not read § 8(1) in such a way as to
render § 8(2)-(3) superfluous, because the Constitution should not be interpreted
in such a way “which would render a provision of the Constitution to be without
any apparent purpose.”181
Oddly enough, Woolman endorsed this very reading of §8(1), which
would render § 8(2)-(3) superfluous.182 Justice O’Regan was responding to an
argument by the applicant (and endorsed by Woolman) in Khumalo to the effect
that one could apply the Bill of Rights directly through § 8(1) without the need of
going through sections 8(2) and 8(3) at all. The argument was that, since § 8(1)
applied all law and bound the judiciary, it could be applied directly to laws
governing private conduct in any case before the Court.183 While Woolman has an
argument for why §8(2) is not rendered purposeless by his reading of § 8(1), it is
not very convincing, and no court has accepted the argument.184
Given that Woolman’s approach to § 8(1) has been rejected by the courts,
his fallback position is to argue that the correct approach to horizontal application
must begin with § 8(2) to determine if a right in the Bill of Rights is applicable.185
If there are one or more applicable rights, then one should turn to § 8(3) to
develop the common law to give effect to the right(s) (assuming that the existing
statutory or common law does not adequately give effect to the right(s)). If there is
no applicable right in the Bill of Rights, then, and only then, should one turn to §
39(2) to interpret and develop the common law in light of the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.186 He argues that if the Court approaches the issue
from the direction of § 39(2) first, there is nothing left for § 8 to do, and this
violates the rule of non-redundancy.187
The idea, or rule, that one should not interpret a Constitution in such a
way that renders provisions without a purpose, perhaps puts too much faith in the
rational forethought of the drafters to create coherent and non-redundant text.

180. Id. at 777.
181. Khumalo & Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at 420 (S. Afr.).
182. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 773. See also Woolman, Application,
supra note 172, at 31-64.
183. This would be similar to an expansive interpretation of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), whereby anytime the judiciary was involved in deciding what the law was,
state action would be implicated.
184. Woolman, Application, supra note 176, at 31-64 to 31-65. Woolman’s argument
is that while section 8(1) applies to law, sections 8(2)-(3) apply to conduct that is not law.
Woolman himself acknowledges that the distinction is not philosophically sound. Id. at 3165.
185. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 773, 777.
186. Id. at 777.
187. Id. at 776.
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Here it is worthwhile to heed the lessons of the bricoleur.188 The Interim
Constitution included an application section (§ 7), but did not contain anything
like § 8(2) or 8(3). It did have the equivalent of § 39(2) in § 35(3). It would have
helped if the § 8(2) and (3) application provisions were more clearly integrated
with the § 39(2) interpretation provision. While § 8(1) and § 39(1) have little
connection, and could easily remain at opposite ends of the Bill of Rights,
subsections 2 and 3 were perhaps left too far apart. Both §§ 39(2) and 8(2)-(3)
were written from the perspective of ignorance as to their reach. They were
intentionally drafted to allow the courts to incrementally fill in the scope of the
Bill of Rights application to persons, the common law, and customary law. If one
route to application swallows the other and achieves the same results, there is little
reason to worry about unrealistic expectations of forethought on the part of the
drafters, particularly when the provisions in question were specifically designed to
allow for incremental, case-by-case development.
Although Woolman concedes that a “muscular” approach to § 39(2)
could hypothetically provide rules of the type that Woolman believes a § 8
analysis is more likely to provide, he argues that the courts have not adopted such
a muscular approach.189 His main argument against allowing § 39 to do all the
work is that it renders § 8 largely redundant and that it calls into question the very
need for a Bill of Rights.190 He goes so far as to argue that if § 39(2) and § 8
require the same mode of analysis, then why is a Bill of Rights with specific
provisions necessary, as opposed to having a short list of goods based on the
values of the Constitution?191 His answer is that the framers intended to have two
separate processes: one that works through the rights; freedoms and rules derived
therefrom to determine if law or conduct is invalid; and one that does not require
an analysis of whether a right needs to be vindicated nor permits a finding of
invalidity.192
However, there is nothing in the text that forbids a court from
“invalidating” existing law via the § 39(2) process. The only reason one might
think that a § 39(2) process should not lead to a declaration of invalidity is if the §
39(2) process did not result in a constitutional ruling, or did not result in a
decision that was based on the “supreme law of the Republic.” Section 2, the
supremacy clause, reads that “[t]his Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations
188. Mark Tushnet devotes several pages to the negotiations and last minute drafting
of the South African Constitution in his section on Bricolage. Tushnet, supra note 49, at
1296-1300.
189. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 766 n.6. He does note that only 7 of 23
decisions handed down up to October 2007 have included a direct application of a
provision of the Bill of Rights. He does not mention which cases these are.
190. Id. at 769.
191. Id.
192. Id. Note that Woolman does not cite any authority for the view that this is what
the drafters intended.
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imposed by it must be fulfilled.”
Contrary to the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence,193 Woolman and a
number of other authors have argued that the § 39(2) process is not a
constitutional law process, but merely a common law process.194 Woolman’s view
appears to rest on the idea, which has been endorsed by the Court, that the values
enunciated in § 1, of The Founding Provisions do not give rise to enforceable
rights.195 He concludes from this that “rights give rise to rules and enforceable
claims. Values do not.”196 Thus, according to Woolman, when the Court
collapses the § 8 “rights” approach with a § 39(2) “values” approach, then one
abandons legal rules for legal values.197
This result, however, does not logically follow. It confuses a mechanism
or process for determining what the law is, with the outcome of that process or
mechanism. If one reads § 8(2) and § 39(2) closely, the difference in the meaning
between these two provisions reduces to a distinction between giving effect to a
right through the development of the common law, and developing the common
law in light of the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.198 Both of
these mechanisms can produce legal standards and legal rules. While the
founding values themselves do not create legal rules, § 39(2) allows the courts to
draw on those values (among others) to develop constitutionally mandated
common law rules.
If one approaches the Constitution from the perspective of the South
African tradition of reading legislation and constitutions according to the plain
193. See Carmichele v Minster of Safety & Sec. & Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at
960-62 (S. Afr.); NM & Others v Smith & Others 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) at ¶ 27 (S. Afr.).
194. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 781-83; see id. at 782 n.40.
195. Minister of Home Affairs v Nat’l Inst. for Crime Prevention and the ReIntegration of Offenders & Others 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at 261 (S. Afr.). Section 1
provides a list of the Republic’s founding values. It states:
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state
founded on the following values:
(a)
Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms.
(b)
Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c)
Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d)
Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll,
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 1.
196. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 771-72.
197. Id.
198. It is important to note that § 8(2)-(3) deals only with the issue of applying the Bill
of Rights to a natural and juristic person, while § 39(2) applies also to legislation,
customary law and common law, including common-law crimes. Thus, § 39(2) has a much
broader scope than § 8.
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meaning of the text, then there is a superficial sense in which it makes sense to
think that rules that are grounded in constitutional provisions are more
constitutional, or more constitutionally firm than rules grounded in constitutional
values. Resort to values, from this perspective, has a tradition of being viewed as
extra-legal and as a suspect method of interpretation. This superficial privileging
of textual provisions over values underlying the text breaks down when the textual
provisions of the Constitution direct the interpreter to interpret the text in light of
those values and to develop the common law in light of those values. This is
precisely what § 39 does.
As noted, Woolman is not alone in holding the view that the § 39(2)
process does not give rise to constitutional questions. Johan De Waal et. al. in the
fourth edition of THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK,199 held the view that while
direct application founds a constitutional cause of action which overrides normal
law,200 indirect application does not override normal law.201 From this, they adopt
the opposite conclusion from Woolman’s, namely, they argue that a court should
consider indirect application before direct application because the former is less
constitutional and thus gives more scope to the legislature to do its democratic
job.202 The idea is that it is always better to decide a case without recourse to the
Constitution, if possible, because it leaves the legislature the space to reform the
law in accordance with its own interpretation of the Constitution.203 The authors
argue that because the Constitutional Court has the final say on what the
Constitution means it should not put a straightjacket on the legislature (at least not
in most cases).204
199. HANDBOOK, supra note 173.
200. Id. at 63.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 66-67; see also HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 50. It may appear that Iain
Currie is holding contrary views. On the one hand, he believes that in most common law
cases the outcome of § 39(2) and § 8(3) will be the same. However, he also holds on to the
view that because § 8 involves “direct” application while section 39(2) involves indirect
application, the former is more constitutional and should be avoided. He holds this view
because he believes in the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and because he thinks that §
8 more directly implicates the Constitution. However, since the Constitutional Court has
determined that § 39(2) matters are constitutional matters, it makes little sense to hold on to
the view that § 8 is “more” constitutional. This is a bit like the idea that one can be more or
less pregnant.
203. HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 66-67 (citing S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC)
at ¶ 59 (S. Afr.) (Kentridge, AJ)).
204. Id. at 68-69. See also Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne, Du Plessis is Not
Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private
Disputes, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 25 (1999) [hereinafter Private Disputes]; Chris Sprigman
& Michael Osborne, Behold Angry Native Becomes Postmodernist Prophet of Judicial
Messiah, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 693, 699-708 (2001) [hereinafter Behold Angry]. Sprigman and
Osborne see direct application as settling constitutional issues and thus pre-empting the
legislature while indirect application is perceived as being non-constitutional, or simply
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Like Woolman, de Waal et al. argue that direct application is about
conflict between existing law and the Bill of Rights, which, if it exists, would
result in a declaration of invalidity.205 They claim that indirect application is not
about conflict but about avoidance of conflict through interpretation and/or
development of the common law.206
There is some truth to this view in the context of common law crimes.
For example, one can contrast the direct application of the Bill of Rights to the
common law crime of sodomy in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality & Another v Minister of Justice & Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), 1998 (1)
BCLR 1517 (CC), with the Court’s indirect application of the law to the crime of
rape in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007(5) SA 30 (CC), 2007 (8)
BCLR 827. It is true that in the former case, the Court invalidated the common
law of sodomy because it was inconsistent with the constitutional rights to dignity
and equality, while in the latter case, the Court developed the common law rule
with regard to rape by extending it from cases involving intentional, and
nonconsensual vaginal penetration to a case involving the intentional, non
consensual anal penetration of a woman.207 The Court even took pains not to
extend the rule beyond women to men because the case before the Court involved
a female victim; while it indicated in dicta that it would extend the law to include
men in a proper case before the Court, it also held that it should be left for the
legislature to pass a more general law unless and until such a case was brought
before the Court.208 As the Court noted in Masiya, it would make little sense to
invalidate the crime of rape for being under-inclusive (for not including
nonconsensual anal penetration).209 As it noted, this would be akin to throwing
out the baby with the bath water.210 The remedy of developing, or amending the
law makes much more sense in this context.
common law and thus amendable by Parliament. Private Disputes, supra note 204, at 2830; Behold Angry, supra note 204, at 696. The authors state that the crucial difference
between direct and indirect application is that “where a court applies the Bill of Rights
indirectly, its judgment is a non-constitutional ruling, which the legislature may overturn,
modify develop or elaborate by ordinary legislation.” Private Disputes, supra note 204, at
28; see Behold Angry, supra note 204, at 703–04. The authors believe that while in the
indirect case there can be a give-and-take relationship between the courts and the
legislature in the direct case it is only the courts that speak. Private Disputes, supra note
204, at 30.
205. HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 64-65.
206. Id. at 65.
207. Masiya v Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Pretoria & Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) at
45-47 (S. Afr.).
208. Id. at 46-47, 52. Note that this failure to extend the development of the law to
include men was strongly criticized by Chief Justice Langa and Justice Sachs in their
concurring in part and dissenting in part decision. Id. at 60-65. Woolman likewise
criticizes this aspect of the decision. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 767.
209. Masiya (5) SA at 45.
210. Id.
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While Masiya does avoid at least one type of conflict and allows the
legislature some room to develop the law, it does not follow that the Court’s
ruling is less rule-like or less constitutional. It would be a mistake to think that its
ruling would allow the executive, the legislature, or the courts below to come to a
contrary result. If prosecutors refused to prosecute any of these cases, if the courts
below refused to apply the new rule to cases before them, or if Parliament passed
a law that limited the definition of rape to vaginal penetration only, this conduct
and the law passed by parliament would conflict with and would eventually be
found to be contrary to the decision in Masiya. Further, such laws and conduct
would be found to be contrary to the Constitution and as such, would be struck
down.
As noted above, Woolman argues that one has a basis in values while the
other has a basis in textual rights provisions; and for this reason, he believes that
the latter produces constitutional rules, while the former does not. Above I
demonstrated that this argument breaks down because the mandate to give effect
to the values of the Constitution is included in the Constitution’s textual
provisions. The distinction also breaks down in the other direction. The
provisions in the Bill of Rights, as a general rule, are blends of rules and values.
For example, Woolman strongly criticizes the Court for its approach to
the case of NM & Others v Smith & Others,211 which involves the intentional and
nonconsensual publishing of the applicant names and H.I.V. statuses in a
biography.212 The Court chose to develop the common law action of invasion of
privacy to cover the case in order to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the
Bill of Rights, and in particular dignity and privacy. According to Woolman, the
Court should have addressed the rights to privacy and dignity in the Bill of Rights
directly, rather than indirectly.213 What the Court did instead was address the
rights to dignity and privacy as articulated in the law of delict, particularly under
the actio iniuriarum, and in light of the constitutional values of dignity and
privacy. The Court also looked to the value of freedom of expression in
determining how far it would develop the action and in determining the amount of
damages in the case. The Court cited and even quoted the language of the Bill of
Rights provisions with regards to privacy,214 but those provisions had little to offer
211. 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) (S. Afr.).
212. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 781.
213. Id. at 782-83. For some reason Woolman ignores the Court’s treatment of the
right to freedom of expression at ¶¶ 31, 43 (it also discusses dignity, equality, and freedom
at ¶ 49), and especially ¶¶ 66-69, where it noted that that it was not changing one of the
elements of the action from a requirement of intent to a mere requirement of negligence,
thereby avoiding the chilling effect that such a change would have on freedom of
expression through publication. It also addressed the issue of the chilling effect on freedom
of expression of large damage awards in such cases at ¶ 73. This, in part, influenced the
decision to award 35,000 rand to each of the three plaintiffs (approximately $3,500 at the
current exchange rate).
214. NM (5) SA at ¶¶ 27 & n. 9.
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in the way of creating rules to cover the situation. Section 10, The Right to
Human Dignity, reads: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected.” Section 14, The Right to Privacy reads:
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to
have:
a. their person or home searched;
b. their property searched;
c. their possessions seized; or
d. the privacy of their communications infringed.
Section 10, The Right to Human Dignity provides little to no guidance
for fashioning a rule, and the § 14 provisions, which largely deal with searches
and seizures, appear to be written primarily with the state in mind. It is unclear
how they might apply to persons in this case, or how the common law rules could
be developed to vindicate the constitutional right in this case. They do not really
address the common law right to privacy, which is much broader than this right.
The Right to Human Dignity easily applies to persons, and it already does under
the common law action for insult to dignity and to some extent in the action for
invasion of privacy.215 One can also look to other provisions in the Bill of Rights,
for instance the provision on safety and security of the person, §12, which
includes a right to bodily and psychological integrity. These provisions and rights
could be cobbled together and balanced against the right to freedom of expression
in § 16, which includes the “freedom to receive or impart information or ideas.”
These provisions do not, however, provide better guidance in developing a
common law rule than the values of the Constitution. In fact, it is not likely
possible to interpret and balance these provisions in a way that justifies the
creation of a particular rule without recourse to constitutional values.
Although I agree with Woolman that the Court does not do a good job in
its § 39 analysis, it is unlikely that it could have done a better job with a § 8
analysis. It is significantly more difficult to try to vindicate these constitutional
rights, which were not written with horizontal application in mind,216 than it is to
215. Under the law of delict, the right to privacy is an independent action under the
concept of dignitas. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 42, at 354. There are two forms of the
action, one relating to invasion of privacy, and the other relating to disclosure of private
facts. Id. at 355. The requirements for such actions are abstract since what is required is
that the invasion or disclosure was legally wrongful and there was no legal justification for
the invasion or disclosure. The law in this area has been decided on a case-by-case basis
with very few general rules.
216. See generally Penelope E. Andrews, Incorporating International Human Rights
Law in National Constitutions: The South African Experience, in PROGRESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 835 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008). Although
Andrews notes the wide range of international human rights that informed the drafting of
the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, she nowhere addresses the horizontal application of any of
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start where the rights have already been developed to a point with horizontal
application in mind. In other words, to the extent that these rights already exist in
the private common law, it will often be much easier to develop them in light of
the values of the Constitution than to try to develop rules to vindicate
constitutional rights that were drafted to apply to the state.
The provisions containing the rights to dignity and privacy are practically
the same in the Interim Constitution, and that Constitution was not written with a
horizontal application provision.217 In other words, there was no equivalent
provision to § 8(2) although there was an equivalent provision to § 39(2).218
The Court did not attempt a § 8 analysis because neither the parties nor
the Court below attempted a § 8 analysis.219 Although Professor Woolman
criticizes the Court for its failure to engage in a § 8 analysis, he nowhere attempts
such an analysis himself.220
Whether Woolman’s criticisms are correct or not, the majority of cases
addressing conflicts between the common law and the Constitution, since the end
of Apartheid, have been § 39(2) cases.221 According to the Constitutional Court:
It needs to be stressed that the obligation of courts to develop the
common law, in the context of the § 39(2) objectives, is not
purely discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in § 39(2),
read with § 173, that where the common law, as it stands, is
deficient in promoting the § 39(2) objectives, the courts are
under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.222
these rights.
217. Section 10 of the Interim Constitution, Human Dignity, provided that, “[e]very
person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity” while section
13, Privacy, provided that, “[e]very person shall have the right to his or her personal
privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person,
home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private
communications.” S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, §§ 10, 13.
218. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, § 35(3).
219. The Court in Carmichele v Minster of Safety & Security & Another articulated
how important it was for arguments of this sort to be developed from the trial court level all
the way up through the appellate courts before reaching the Constitutional Court. 2001 (4)
SA 938 (CC) at 960-961 (S. Afr.).
220. Having taught South African Constitutional Law and Delict for five and a half
years and having written on it for over ten years, I am not sure I could make a decent
section 8 argument in this case.
221. Woolman notes that only seven out of twenty-three cases handed down through
to October 2007 employ the direct application of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 766 n.6.
222. Carmichele (4) SA at 955. Some commentators have argued that not much
would change or need to be changed in the private common law. See, e.g., Peter Kutner,
supra note 57, at 363 (“In tort law and numerous other fields, one should expect a large
measure of continuity with the past, not radical alteration of substantive law or applicable legal
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B. What Does it Mean to Develop the Common Law in Light of the Spirit,
Purport, and Objects of the Bill of Rights?
Now that we have arrived at this mandate, what does it mean? What is
the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights? What are its objects? While the
Constitution includes some clues, it nowhere provides a definitive list of its
objects and as the word implies, it probably would not be possible to capture its
spirit in a definitive list. Although the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of
Appeal, and various divisions of the High Court of South Africa have attempted to
fulfill the mandate in the cases before them, no Court has attempted to
comprehensively capture the clauses’ meanings. It is probably unrealistic to
expect this of the courts. What exists instead are varied judgments grappling with,
on the one hand, existing rules, rights and duties under the common law and
legislation, and on the other, a range of partially coherent partially competing
values (sprit, objects, and purposes) of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.223
The Constitution’s textual clues can be found in the Preamble,224 the
philosophy.”). See also P.J. Visser, Some Remarks on the Relevance of the Bill of Rights in the
Field of Delict, 1998 J. S. AFR. L. 529, 536. It is still common for the Supreme Court of Appeal
to ignore the mandate. For instance, Justice Brand in Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v
Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd. 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA) (S. Afr.), followed the Apartheid precedent
of Lillicrap Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. 1985 (1) SA 475 (A) (S.
Afr.), in holding that plaintiffs did not have a cause of action for pure economic loss resulting
from a design defect in their aquariams caused by the respondents. Justice Brand addressed the
issue in the case as covering the question of extending delictual liability by requiring a duty of
care by the plaintiffs, but nowhere even mentioned § 39(2). Rather, the Court reiterated the dicta
that the English approach was liberal with regard to the extension of a duty of care, while South
Africa is conservative. Id. at 148. The court saw no reason to “rescue a plaintiff who was in the
position to avoid the risk of harm by contractual means.” Id. at 149. See also Media 24 Ltd &
Another v Grobler Case No. 301/04 (SCA) at (June 1, 2005) (S. Afr.) (Farlam, JA),
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/4041.pdf (involving the
question of vicarious liability of an employer for the sexual harassment of one employee
against another in light of the question as to whether the cause of action is precluded by
either the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995); Lillicrap (1) SA 475. Although the decision
was correctly decided, in my opinion, by distinguishing Lillicrap and by not finding the
cause of action precluded by the Labour Relations Act, the Court failed to engage section
39(2) or the constitutional values when making its determination. Acting Justice Farlam
even adopted part of the holding in Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 (4) SA
938 (CC) at 957 in order to determine liability, namely, “whether [the applicants] ought
reasonably and practically to have prevented harm to the respondent: put differently, was it
reasonable to expect [applicants] to have taken positive measures to prevent the harm?”
Media 24, Case no. 301/04, at 16.
223. It is common for the courts to reduce the “spirit, purport and objects” of the Bill
of Rights to values. See infra text accompanying notes 254-313 (discussing the notion of
an “objective normative value system”).
224. The Preamble of the Constitution Reads in part:
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Founding Provisions,225 and Chapter 2, The Bill of Rights. Clues can also be
found in the structure of the Constitution and in the history of struggle leading up
to its adoption. There are some clues in the academic literature, but for the most
part, commentators avoid the question and simply follow the lead of the courts as
they work through the application of the clause in the cases before them.
1. Values of the Bill of Rights Versus Values of the Constitution

We, the people of South Africa,
Recognise the injustices of our past;
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our
diversity.
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as toHeal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice, and fundamental human
rights;
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in
which government is based on the will of the people and
every citizen is equally protected by law;
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential
of each person;
and
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its
rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.
S. AFR. CONST. 1993, pmbl.
225. Sections 1 and 2 of the Founding Provisions read:
1. Republic of South Africa
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state
founded on the following values:
a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms.
b. Non-racialism and non-sexism.
c. Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
d. Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
2. Supremacy of Constitution
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be
fulfilled.
S. AFR. CONST. 1993, ch. 1, §§ 1, 2.
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While § 39(2) directs courts to develop the common law in terms of the
spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights, there is little to be gained from
attempting to distinguish these values and aspirations from those that underlie the
Constitution as a whole. In the case of K v Minister of Safety & Security,226
Justice O’Regan looked to the values of the Constitution rather than merely the
Bill of Rights in her treatment of developing the common law of vicarious liability
under FC § 39(2). As she stated,
The overall purpose of section 39(2) is to ensure that our
common law is infused with the values of the Constitution . . . .
The normative influence of the Constitution must be felt
throughout the common law. Courts making decisions which
involve the incremental development of the rules of the common
law in cases where the values of the Constitution are relevant are
therefore also bound by the terms of section 39(2). The
obligation imposed upon courts by section 39(2) of the
Constitution is thus extensive, requiring courts to be alert to the
normative framework of the Constitution not only when some
startling new development of the common law is in issue, but in
all cases where the incremental development of the rule is in
issue.227
Although neither settled, nor exhaustive, the list of values that form the
spirit, purport, and objects of the Constitution include:
1) Social justice and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms (with an emphasis on human dignity, substantive
equality, and non-discrimination);228
226. 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) (S. Afr.).
227. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
228. Arguably, this set of values is the most important. It is found in the pre-amble,
sections 1(a)–(b) and Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights chapter. Justice O’Regan has called it
“[t]he leitmotif of our Constitution.” Kaunda & Others v The President of the Republic of
South Africa & Others 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) at 298 (S. Afr.). In other words, it is the
dominant recurring theme. The first mentioned value, “non-discrimination,” should be
stated as “non-unfair-discrimination,” but this is an awkward phrase. Section 1(b) is
worded as non-racialism and non-sexism. This may lead one to conclude that unfair
discrimination based on race and sex are more strictly scrutinized under the law than other
forms of unfair discrimination (as is the case in the U.S). This is not the case. Neither
section 9, Equality, nor the jurisprudence of the courts supports this view. Section 9(5)
applies the presumption of unfairness to discrimination on any of the 17 listed grounds
(race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth). Once
discrimination on one of these grounds is established, the burden shifts to the State to
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2) Constitutionalism (including the supremacy of
Constitution);
3) The rule of law;
4) Democracy and accountability;
5) Separation of powers and checks and balances;
6) Co-operative government and devolution of power;
7) Transformation;
8) Ubuntu; and
9) Cosmopolitanism.
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While it could be argued that some of these values are more
concerned with the overall Constitution than the Bill of Rights, they really
inform both. The values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of
law found in both §§ 1(c) and 2 of the Founding Provisions of the Constitution,
as well as the values of accountability, responsiveness, and openness found in
§ 1(d) are part of the values of the Bill of Rights. Several of the reasons for
judicial review are to promote these values, to entrench certain rights, and to
place them beyond the influence of simple majority whim. This also
promotes the rule of law over the rule of individuals or even the rule of
Parliament. The Bill of Rights also provides for accountability, responsiveness,
and openness.229 These values, which underlie what has been referred to as a
demonstrate that the discrimination was fair.
229. Accountability, responsiveness, and openness have become important values in
the interpretation of legislation and the development of the common law under section
39(2), particularly in delict cases involving the state. See, e.g., K (6) SA 419, where
Justice O’Regan used these values from section 1 to argue that the courts need to address
the doctrinal area of vicarious liability as one with normative implications that subject it
to scrutiny under § 39 (2). As she states, “[d]enying that the principles bear such normative
implications will only bedevil the exercise by rendering inarticulate, premises that in a
democracy committed to openness, responsiveness and accountability should be
articulated.” Id. at 432-33. See also Zealand v Minister for Justice & Const. Dev. &
Another 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) ¶¶ 24-25 (S. Afr.) (Chief Justice Langa using the
fundamental values of freedom and dignity from section 1 in conjunction with the right to
freedom and security of the person (which includes the right not to be deprived of freedom
arbitrarily or without just cause) to impose delictual liability on the state for holding a
prisoner in a maximum security prison for five years after he successfully appealed his
conviction); id. ¶¶ 24, 30 (the court also using the constitutional norm of accountability to
inform its decision to apply delictual liability). See also Faircape Prop. Developers
(Pty) Ltd. v Premier, W. Cape 2002 (6) SA 180 (C) (S. Afr.) (Davis, J.), rev’d 2003 (6)
SA 13 (SCA) (S. Afr.)); Van Duivenboden v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) All SA
127 (C) (S. Afr.) (Davis, J.), aff’d 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (Nugent, J.); Rail
Commuter Action Group & Others v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail & Others 2005 (2)
SA 359 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that Transnet Ltd. had a legal duty to keep its passengers
reasonably safe from crime on its trains running in Cape Town), reversing 2003 (6) SA
349 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (holding that Transnet Ltd. did not have a legal duty to keep its
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“culture of justification,” are both hallmarks of the transformation and
important objects of the Bill of Rights.230 The values of the transformation,
found throughout the Constitution, are also embodied in the Bill of Rights.
Thus, the interpretation of legislation and the development of the common law
and customary law that promotes these values also promote the spirit, purport,
and objects of the Bill of Rights. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, § 39(1)
requires the courts to "promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" and to
consult international law.231 Since the interpretation of the Bill of Rights is
accomplished by promoting the broader set of values, it would be peculiar to
argue that they were not part of the values of the Bill of Rights themselves.
Finally, Chapter 2, The Bill of Rights begins with § 7(1), which states that “the
Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.” Thus, there can
be little question that democratic government, accountability, and responsiveness
are among the fundamental objects of the Bill of Rights, and its fulfillment
requires attention to the values of §§ 1(c) and (d), which, after all, are the
founding values of South Africa's democratic republic.
The first four values listed above are found in § 1 of chapter 1, Founding
Provisions, but values 5 and 6 are not found anywhere in Chapter 1.232 The value
of cooperative government is most explicitly found in Chapter 3, “Co-operative
Government,” but the value or principle flows throughout the Constitution. 233
Similarly, the notion of separation of powers and checks and balances, while
explicit in the 34 constitutional principles under principle VI,234 is only implicitly
passengers safe from crime, for that duty was one placed generally on the shoulders of
the police services).
230. The idea that South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation is based on a culture
of justification is attributable to Professor Etienne Mureinik, who argued that the new
dispensation is based on “a culture of justification—a culture in which every exercise of
power is expected to be justified.” Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994).
231. It is optional for the courts to consider foreign law, although it is much more
common for them to engage foreign law in their judgments than to consult international
law.
232. HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 7 (referring to the “[b]asic principles of the new
constitutional order”). This includes only principles 2 through 6 in its list, and although
cooperative government and devolution of power is listed, the Chapter does not address
them. Id. Similarly, in 1 I. CURRIE & J. DEWAAL, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3 (2002), Currie & DeWaal address what they call the “Basic Features
of the New Constitutional Order,” which includes these same features or principles. Note,
they leave out many of the values explicitly mentioned in § 1 of the Constitution.
233. See Stuart Woolman, Theunis Roux & Barry Bekink, Co-Operative Government
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 176, at 14-1.
234. “There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive, and
judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness,
and openness.” S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, sched. 4, § IV.
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embodied throughout the Final Constitution.
The broad values of social justice and human rights are found in the
Preamble § 1, and are entrenched in Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights.235 Arguably the
most foundational values behind those rights are found in § 1, which include the
advancement of human rights and freedoms, human dignity, substantive
equality,236 and non-discrimination.
These values are also bound up with the value of transformation.237 The
value of transformation is embodied in the struggle to rid South Africa of
Apartheid and its vestiges, and can be found in the text of the Preamble of the
Final Constitution. That principle includes the value of moving from a society
with an “unjust past” to a “society based on democratic values, social justice, and
fundamental human rights,” which is concerned with “[i]mprov[ing] the quality of
life of all citizens and free[ing] the potential of each person.”238 As the late Justice
Mahomed stated in S v Makwanyane & Another:
In some countries the Constitution only formalizes, in a legal
instrument, a historical consensus of values and aspirations
evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken past to
accommodate the needs of the future. The South African
235. The Bill of Rights is not an exhaustive list of the rights that exist in South Africa.
Section 39(3) provides, “[t]he Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights
or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation,
to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.” S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(3).
236. Section 1(a) refers to “the achievement of equality” which entails the notion of
substantive equality. Substantive equality, like “the advancement of human rights,” is an
affirmative goal and requires more than non-discrimination. The goal of substantive
equality is a goal for all persons in South Africa, but of course those persons and groups
who have been denied equality or became disadvantaged by unfair discrimination are in the
most need of positive steps taken on their behalf. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 9(2).
The value of transformation is also embodied in these affirmative goals.
237. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at
771-72 (S. Afr.) (Chaskalson, CJ) (“We live in a society in which there are great disparities
in wealth. Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. . . .
These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to
address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity,
freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order.”).
238. G.E. Devenish views the non-justiciable Preamble as setting forth foundational
values. G.E. DEVENISH, A COMMENTARY ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION (1998).
He, following Rautenbach and Malherbe, sees the Preamble as part of the principles or
values that inform the interpretation of all provisions of the Constitution as well as
legislation, customary law and the development of the common law under § 39(2). Id. at
32. HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 13-16 and CURRIE & DEWAAL, supra note 232, at 82,
89, refers to the preamble when addressing the foundational principles or basic features of
democracy. They are not, however, referring to the transformative value mentioned above
but the value of a “democratic and open society.”
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Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is
defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing
rejection of, that part of the past which is disgracefully racist,
authoritarian, insular and repressive, and a vigorous
identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic,
caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly articulated
in the Constitution.239
More recently Ngcobo, J. stated in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Environmental Affairs & Tourism & Others:240
South Africa is a country in transition. It is a transition from a
society based on inequality to one based on equality. This
transition was introduced by the Interim Constitution, which was
designed
to create a new order . . . [based on equality] in which
there is equality between men and women and people
of all races so that all citizens should be able to enjoy
and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms.
This commitment to the transformation of our society was
affirmed and reinforced in 1997, when the Constitution came
into force. The Preamble to the Constitution ‘recognises the
239. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 487 (S. Afr.). Karl Klare has argued that the new South
African constitutionalism is a post liberal, redistributive, egalitarian and caring form of
constitutionalism. Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146, 150-53 (1998). Klare was writing in the context of the Interim
Constitution, but the Final Constitution is no less progressive. Id. He notes the following
elements found in the Interim Constitution in support of his view: 1) social rights and
substantive equality; 2) affirmative state duties; 3) horizontality; 4) participatory;
decentralized and transparent governance; 5) multi-culturalism; and 6) historical selfconsciousness. Id. at 153-55. All of these values can be found in the Final Constitution.
See also Woolman, The Last Laugh, supra note 176; Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt,
Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous
Jurisprudence of Equality, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 248 (1998); Hugh Corder, Prisoner,
Partisan and Patriarch: Transforming the Law in South Africa 1985-2000, 118 S. AFR. L.J.
772 (2001); Arthur Chaskalson, The Third Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a
Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193 (2000);
Dikgang Moseneke, The Fourth Bram Fischer Lecture: Transformative Adjudication, 18 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 309 (2002); Christopher J. Roederer, Post-Matrix Legal Reasoning:
Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South African Law, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 57
(2003); Roederer, Democracy, supra note 6.
240. 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at 523 (S. Afr.) (quoting S. AFR. (Interim) CONST., pmbl.)
(quoted in Kaunda v President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) at 281 n.6
(S. Afr.) (Ngcobo, J., concurring); id. at 298 (O’Regan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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injustices of our past’ and makes a commitment to establishing
‘a society based on democratic values, social justice and
fundamental rights.’ This society is to be built on the foundation
of the values entrenched in the very first provision of the
Constitution.
These values include human dignity, the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights
and freedoms.’
Although there may be considerable dispute over what the principle or
value of transformation entails,241 there is no dispute that it is a value or principle
that animates the entire Constitution.242
This value is linked with the values embodied in the notion of ubuntu,
which was a part of the post-amble of the Interim Constitution and is derived from
traditional African values.243 As Pieterse writes, “[t]he Nguni word ubuntu
represents notions of universal human interdependence, solidarity and
communalism which can be traced to small-scale communities in pre-colonial
Africa, and which underlie virtually every indigenous African culture.”244 In S v
Makwanyane,245 Justice Langa articulated:

241. What the value entails is largely dependent on what the evil of Apartheid
entailed, for this, by definition, is what is in need of transformation. For instance, was the
libertarian approach to private law part of the evil or problem, or was the problem the
distortion of the libertarian system? My view is that both were part of the evil. My view is
that the Apartheid cancer did spread to private law and that to the extent that it did not
infect private law, the private law, with its libertarian values, acted as a carrier and
facilitator of Apartheid values and policies, perpetuating the inequities of Apartheid.
Further, the development of private law was arrested under Apartheid and finally, even if
some areas of private law were not infected by the Apartheid cancer, many of the values
that animated private law under Apartheid are inconsistent with the values, goals and
aspirations of the democratic transformation of South Africa. See Roederer, Democracy,
supra note 6, at 453-496.
242. Frank I. Michelman, in The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the
Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 176, at 11-38 argues,
“‘[s]upremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law’ signifies the unity of the legal system
in the service of transformation by, under, and according to law.” Thus, according to
Michelman, even the values of § 1(c) are infused with the transformational objective.
243. G.E. Devenish treats ubuntu as implicit in the foundational values of § 1.
DEVENISH, supra note 238, at 33. Devenish correctly points out that the Constitutional
Court in S v Makwanyane has referred to the concept as one that underlies the Constitution
and informed its treatment of the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty
throughout the judgment. Id. at 33-34. See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 446,
480-86, 500-03 (S. Afr.).
244. Marius Pieterse, “Traditional” African Jurisprudence, in JURISPRUDENCE 438
(Christopher Roederer & Darrel Moellendorf eds., Juta & Co., Ltd. 2004).
245. (3) SA 391.
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[Ubuntu] is a culture which places some emphasis on
communality and on the interdependence of the members of a
community. It recognises a person’s status as a human being,
entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance
from the members of the community such person happens to be
part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a
corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and
acceptance to each member of that community.
More
importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it
lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment
of rights by all.246
Early in the Court’s history, Justice Sachs called on the Court to pay due
regard to the values of all sections of South African society when interpreting the
Constitution. As he stated:
In broad terms, the function given to this Court by the
Constitution is to articulate the fundamental sense of justice and
right shared by the whole nation as expressed in the text of the
Constitution . . . . Whatever the status of earlier legislation and
jurisprudence may be, the Constitution speaks for the whole of
society and not just one section. . . . The preamble, post-amble
and the principles of freedom and equality espoused in §§ 8, 33
and 35 of the Constitution require such an amplitude of vision . .
. . The secure and progressive development of our legal system
demands that it draw the best from all the streams of justice in
our country . . . . Above all, however, it means giving long
overdue recognition to African law and legal thinking as a
source of legal ideas, values and practice.247
246. Id. at 481. Justices Mahomed, id. at 488, and Mokgoro, id. at 501, also addressed
the meaning of the concept, both emphasizing the notion of humaneness and reciprocity,
and the latter emphasizing the centrality of the notion to the development of South Africa’s
democracy.
247. Id. at 514. He does go on to note that the task will not be easy, as he states,
“[r]edressing the balance in a conceptually sound, methodologically
secure and functionally efficient way will be far from easy. Extensive
research and public debate will be required. Legislation will play a key
role; indeed, the Constitution expressly acknowledges situations where
legal pluralism based on religion can be recognised (§ 14(3)), and where
indigenous law can be applied (§ 181). Constitutional Principle XIII
declares that ‘. . . (i)ndigenous law, like common law, shall be
recognised and applied by the courts, subject to the fundamental rights
contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing specifically
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However, since Justice Sachs’ attempt in Makwanyane to explore the
relation of traditional values to the question of the constitutionality of the death
penalty, references to indigenous values or traditional values as informing an
interpretation of the Constitution are scarce.248 In fact, when there is a conflict of
values, it will most often be the case that traditional values must conform to other
values in the Constitution. As Justice Ngcobo stated in BHE & Others v
Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others:
“[o]ur Constitution contemplates that there will be a coherent
system of law built on the foundations of the Bill of Rights, in
which common law and indigenous law should be developed and
legislation should be interpreted so as to be consistent with the
Bill of Rights and with our obligations under international law.
In this sense the Constitution demands a change in the legal
norms and the values of our society.” And indigenous law must
reflect this change.249
The value of cosmopolitanism is one of the more controversial values on
this list.250 Nonetheless, it is a value that finds expression in the Preamble, the Bill
of Rights, and the interpretive provisions of §§ 39 and 233. This value is squarely
captured in the opinion of Justice O’Regan in Kaunda v President of the Republic
of South Africa when she stated:
our Constitution recognises and asserts that, after decades of
isolation, South Africa is now a member of the community of
nations, and a bearer of obligations and responsibilities in terms
of international law. The Preamble of our Constitution states
therewith.’”
Id.
248. But see N.K. v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(O’Regan, J.) (where she drew on these values). In N.K., O’Regan addressed the fact that
the notion of vicarious liability is not alien to the South African customary law tradition,
for under customary law the Kraalhead is liable for all the delictual acts of inhabitants of
the Kraal. Id. at 434 n.30. Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000
(1) SA 997 (C) (S. Afr.) (Van Herden, J.) refers to the protection of the family as a value
underlying and sustaining traditional values. Id. at 1034 (citing and quoting from the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 18, ¶ 1 (1986) (providing that “(t)he
family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which
shall take care of its physical and moral health,”); id. art. 18, ¶ 2 (“(t)he State shall have the
duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognised
by the community.”)).
249. 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 657 (S. Afr.) (quoting Daniels v Campbell NO & Others
2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) ¶ 56 (S. Afr.)).
250. There is no South African work that treats this as a foundational value or as part
of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
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that the Constitution is adopted as the supreme law of the
Republic so as to, amongst other things, “build a united and
democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a
sovereign state in the family of nations.”
Customary
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Courts, when
interpreting the Bill of Rights, “must consider international law”
and, when interpreting legislation, must prefer any reasonable
interpretation consistent with international law over alternative
interpretations that are not.251
The value of cosmopolitanism came with the transition. It is part of the
break from the Apartheid regime which both isolated and marginalized itself and
which was marginalized and ostracized by the international community. The reintegration into that community was part of the struggle to rid South Africa of
Apartheid; those in the struggle reached out to that community, not only for
political support but for the normative support that comes from international
human rights. The Constitution directs those interpreting its provisions to look to
both international and to comparative law,252 not as an afterthought, but because
international and comparative law inspired the provisions of the text.253
C. An Objective Value System, or a Grab Bag of Values?
Given the range of values composing the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights, it is fair to query whether this forms a coherent set of values or is
simply a grab bag of partially cohering and partially conflicting spirits, purports,
and objects. The values are many and varied enough that one can take either tack
with them. For instance, it is possible to weave all of these values together in the
service of one or more conceptions of justice. I think it is easier to weave them
together under a social democratic conception of justice254 than a libertarian
251. Kaunda v President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) at 299 (S.
Afr.). For a treatment of the Court’s use of international law see Devika Hovell & George
Williams, A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation in Australia and South Africa, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 95 (2005).
252. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(b)-(c). Justice Sachs, in his opinion in S v
Makwanyane, called on the courts to equally consult traditional African values as well as
international values when considering whether the death penalty was cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 487-92 (S. Afr.).
253. See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin, The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South
Africa, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 628 (1998).
254. I have argued that the progressive social democratic reading of the Constitution is
not only a plausible reading, but is the best reading of the Constitution in Race Cards,
Academic Debate and Progressive Liberal Scholarship: What is a Liberal Anyway, 118 S.

Working the Common Law Pure

493

conception of justice, but even under historically sensitive libertarian conceptions
of justice, the history of Apartheid would justify a significant level of
redistribution to make up for the unjust acquisition and transfers of property that
took place during Apartheid.255 In other words, even libertarians would need to
recognize the need for transformation. They would, however, have a difficult
time with all the provisions on socio-economic rights, positive state duties, and
especially horizontal application.256 The social democrat or progressive would be
much more comfortable with these provisions.
Nonetheless, it is always possible to take the route of the critical scholar
and argue that it is really all up for grabs and that one can make an equally
plausible argument for any number of orderings of these values. For instance, the
Founding Provisions make special reference to freedom, equality, and dignity. It
is often the case that more than one of these values or principles applies in any
given case where the common law is in need of development. Is there a pecking
order here? Do some values trump others?257 There are many ways to balance
AFR. L.J. 708, 716-717 (2001).
255. For instance, under Robert Nozick’s Conception of Justice in ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (1974).
256. This is, in part, why Chris Sprigman and Michael Osborn argue that the answer to
the question, “when are rights in the Bill of Rights applicable to persons,” is “almost
never.” See Private Disputes, supra note 204.
257. Some tout equality as the prime value. For instance, Justice Kriegler stated in
President of South Africa & Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 34 (S. Afr.) that “[t]he
South African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an egalitarian constitution . . . [I]n
the light of our own particular history, and our vision for the future, a Constitution was written
with equality at its centre. Equality is our Constitution's focus and organising principle.” See
also Klare, supra note 239, at 151, 153); Albertyn & Goldblatt, supra note 239 (criticizing
the Court for substituting dignity for equality in its equality jurisprudence). Others tout
dignity as the prime value. For instance, former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson
acknowledges that there are conflicting values in § 1 that need to be balanced, and his
method of balancing them puts dignity in the prime spot. Chaskalson, supra note 239, at
201-204. In addition to playing this mediating role, Chaskalson interprets equality, (even
substantive equality) as being fundamentally concerned with providing equal dignity. Id. at
202-203 & n.44 (citing several Constitutional Court cases involving equality, some
Canadian cases, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1963), and LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1416
(2d ed. 1988)). Acting Justice Cameron, in his concurring opinion in Brisley v Drotsky
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 35 (S. Afr.), appears to privilege freedom and dignity in his
attempt to shed light on why the court was hesitant to import the concept of boni mores,
or the legal convictions of the community, into the law of contracts. He failed to even
mention equality in this analysis. While noting that the concept of boni mores is now to
be replaced with the “appropriate norms of the objective value system embodied in the
Constitution,” id. at 35 (quoting Carmichele 2002 (4) SA at 962), he went on to hold that
the concept does not “give the courts a general jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the
basis of judicially perceived notions of unjustness or to determine their enforceability on
the basis of imprecise notions of good faith.” Id. According to Acting Justice Cameron,
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these principles. One way would be to privilege one or more of the values or
objects of the Constitution, and to reduce the other values or objects of the
Constitution to servicing the other values or objects.258 Another way would be to
simply balance them on a case-by-case basis, in light of the outcome that one
desires. Although one can utilize this second approach, and although there are
arguments to the effect that this has been the approach of the Constitutional Court,
this approach fosters a problematic attitude. One can always find indeterminacy,
incoherence, and irrationality in the law. There is always fodder for the bricoleur,
and while finding and exploiting indeterminacy and incoherence in the law can
sometimes be advantageous, especially for lawyers and their clients, it is not
generally a laudable goal for the judiciary. It too simplistically reduces law to
politics, and undermines any legitimate role for the judiciary.
In this vein, the members of the first Constitutional Court for South
Africa (the first court in South Africa to exercise full judicial review) were eager
to demonstrate that they were not political actors, but judges applying the law.
Thus, as Justice Kentridge stated in S v Zuma & Others:
While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the
Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written
instrument. I am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that
general language must have a single ‘objective’ meaning. Nor is
it easy to avoid the influence of one's personal intellectual and
moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that
the Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to
mean.259
Although Justice Kentridge avoided any reference to an “objective value
system,” the concept surfaced the next year in a concurring opinion written by
Justice Mahomed in Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk & Another.260 The notion
that South Africa’s Constitution contains an “objective value system”261 draws
this is because contractual autonomy is said to embody both the values of freedom and
dignity, although presumably not equality? He thus concluded that, “[t]he Constitution
requires that its values be employed to achieve a careful balance between the
unacceptable excesses of contractual ‘freedom,’ and securing a framework within which
the ability to contract enhances rather than diminishes our self-respect and dignity.” Id.
258. In either case, two questions are important, namely: (1) which set and balance of
values best coheres with the constitutional text, the history of the struggle leading up to its
drafting, and subsequent decisions of the Courts; and (2) which set and balancing of values
places the Constitution in the best light.
259. 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 652 (S. Afr.).
260. 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.).
261. There is not much to be gained from debating the question of whether or how
“objective” the value system underlying the Constitution is in fact. The value system is
contested and while I think there are better and worse answers to the question of what
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attention to the idea that the Constitution is not merely a grab bag of various
subjective values, or merely a forum for various special interests and political
parties to fight for their agenda. Rather, the concept indicates that the values in
the system are somehow objective and they form a coherent whole – or a system.
Since this early articulation, the concept has been used in numerous cases in
which the courts have attempted to fulfill the § 39(2) mandate. While no case has
yet outlined the parameters of the concept, the cases draw from a whole range of
values found within this system.
The Court can be criticized for operating in what Alfred Cockrell
describes as the land of rainbow jurisprudence, where all the values of the South
African rainbow are seen as functioning together in happy harmony.262 In the
decisions below, the concept is often invoked, but there is little critical assessment
of its meaning or scope. Rather than confront the potential conflicts and limits of
the numerous values within the system, the courts sometimes appear to simply
pick-and-choose the values that support their conclusions.
As noted above, the first indication that the South African Constitution
embodied an “objective normative value system” was in the concurring opinion of
Mahomed, JP in Du Plessis.263 Although he does not explicitly adopt the view, he
implied it when drawing from the German approach to horizontal application. As
he stated, “the basic rights entrenched by the GBL [German Basic Law] not only
establish subjective individual rights but an objective order of values or an
objective value system (‘eine objektive Wertordnung’).”264 This objective order
of values in the German system “acts as a guiding principle and stimulus for” all
three branches of government.”265
The notion is not mentioned again until Carmichele v Minister of Safety
& Security & Another266 where the Court stated:
values are foundational, there is no “objective” way to settle the question.
262. See Alfred Cockrell, Rainbow Jurisprudence, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1996).
This is also one of Woolman’s criticisms. Woolman, Vanishing, supra note 176, at 762-63.
263. (3) SA 850.
264. Id. at 899 (citing 7 BVerfGE 198 at 203-07; 35 BVerfGE 79 at 112-14; Von
Münch/Kunig Von Münch/Kunig Grundgesetz-Kommentar Band 1 (1992) Vorb Art 1-19
Rn 22, 31). Here, Mahomed, JP compared the German approach to horizontal application
for the purposes of showing that the Interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights should be applied
indirectly (in their radiating capacity) to persons, rather than directly. Id. at 899-900. He
does not explicitly tell us that the interim Constitution embodies an “object value system”
nor what that system entails. Id. He does point out, as he did in S v Makwanyane &
Another, that, “‘(i)n reaction to our past, the concept and values of the constitutional State,
of the ‘Regstaat’ . . . are deeply foundational to the creation of the ‘new order’ referred to in
the preamble (of the Constitution).” Id. at 901 (quoting Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC) at 454 (S. Afr.)).
265. Id. at 900 (quoting 39 BVerfGE 1 at 41).
266. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.). Carmichele involved the question of whether
the South African Police and Prosecutor could be held delictually liable for failing to
oppose the bail of a dangerous sexual offender (in spite of numerous pleas by concerned
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Our Constitution is not merely a formal document regulating
public power. It also embodies, like the German Constitution,
an objective, normative value system. As was stated by the
German Federal Constitutional Court:
The jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional
Court is consistently to the effect that the basic
right norms contain not only defensive subjective
rights for the individual but embody at the same
time an objective value system which, as a
fundamental constitutional value for all areas of
the law, acts as a guiding principle and stimulus
for the legislature, executive and judiciary.267
The Court went on to state that “[t]he same is true of our Constitution.”268
The contrast mentioned by the Court is one between constitutions that
embody “defensive subjective rights of the individual” and those that embody an
“objective value system.” This way of formulating the contrast is peculiar. The
contrast is not really between subjective rights and objective values, but a contrast
between a constitution (e.g. like that in the U.S.), that primarily focuses on
negative liberties, or rights against government interference, and a constitution
that envisions government interference based on a system of “objective” values.
The contrast is between a purely liberal constitution that at most embodies a thin
conception of the good for society,269 and a fuller blown republican constitution
which has a thicker conception of the good at which society is to aim.270 On the
liberal view, the government and court are at most neutral referees, whose job it is
to ensure that players play by the rules of the game. On the liberal view, courts
should be hesitant to intervene and develop the common law, for this would be
like the referee joining the game for one side. Thus, a judiciary with this mindset
could avoid the strictures of § 39(2) by simply avoiding developing the common
law. However, the Court in Carmichele held that § 39(2) not only required that
the courts consult this “objective value system” if and when they decided to
develop the common law, but that they were required to consult it proactively to
see if in fact the common law was in need of development, and then to develop it
parties) which resulted in a vicious attack by the offender on Ms. Carmichele. Id.
267. Id. at 961 (quoting 39 BVerfGE at 41); Du Plessis (3) SA at 900 (S. Afr.))
(same).
268. Carmichele (4) SA at 961 (citing S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 (NNHC) at 813
(S. Afr.) (Mahomed, AJ)).
269. See, e.g., John Rawls’ use of the notion in A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (note that
Rawls is not a classical liberal (not libertarian) in his views, but is a welfare liberal).
270. See, e.g., Habermas, Three normative models of democracy, in BENHABIB,
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (ed. 1996) (contrasting liberal and republican theories of
democracy with the idea of deliberative democracy).
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accordingly.271 In other words, part of the value system includes courts getting
involved in shaping the law to conform to this value system. The Constitution is
not merely another doctrinal area of the law, but permeates all the law.
What is the view of “the good” at which the law is to aim? Although the
Court does not directly address the question, it at least tells us what it replaces.
The Court contrasted the English and the German approach to the constitution,
and noted that under the German approach, the German Basic Law has a
“radiating effect” on the “general clauses” of the German Civil Code.272 In South
Africa, the idea is that the objective value system embodied in the Constitution
should come in to replace or supplement and enrich the existing “policy decisions
and value judgments” reflecting “the wishes . . . and the perceptions . . . of the
people” and “society's notions of what justice demands,”273 and this enriched
value system should then radiate through the common law. This can be contrasted
with the English and American approach which does not generally view the
constitution as having a radiating effect on the common law.
Rather,
constitutional law is often seen as a separate doctrinal area of the law.
In the Carmichele case, the Court did not limit itself to the values
detailed in the Founding Provisions in deciding if the police had a duty towards
Ms. Carmichele. Rather, the Court looked to values found in the Bill of Rights
provisions regarding the rights to life, dignity and freedom and security of the
person,274 and in the South African constitutional provisions that point towards a
positive duty to prevent harm.275 The Court found that these duties are
accentuated in the case of women, both because of the historically vulnerable
place of women within South African society,276 and because of South Africa’s
international obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.277 Thus, the Court draws on a range of
foundational values, from transformation for South African women and
cosmopolitanism, to the promotion of the various specific rights in the Bill of
Rights that are in play.278 The Court nowhere claimed that the values it drew on
271. Carmichele (4) SA at 955.
272. For instance, through clauses referring to ‘good morals,’ ‘justified,’ ‘wrongful,’
‘contra bonos mores,’ ‘good faith,’ etc. Id. at 962.
273. Id. (quoting Minister of Law & Order v Kadir 1995 (1) SA 303 (A) at 318 (S.
Afr.).
274. Id. at 957.
275. Id. at 957-58. Such positive duties with regards to the police can be found in
both the Interim Constitution, the Final Constitution, and in the Police Act. Id. at 964-65.
276. Id.
277. See Carmichele (4) SA at 965 n.67.
278. Minister of Safety & Sec. v van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) at 444-46
(S. Afr.) (Nugent, JA) (following Carmichele, and quoting the language of the Court with
regards to the Constitution’s “objective value system.”). Justice Nugent focuses in on the
value of providing effective, transparent, coherent and accountable government. Id. at 44546. However, he does not locate these values in § 1(d) of the Final Constitution, but in §
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were the only foundational or constitutional values. It made no attempt to address
all the values, but rather picked and chose those values that were helpful to
resolving the present case.
Similarly, Justice O’Regan in Kaunda, states that the Constitution
“embodies ‘an objective, normative value system’ as is asserted in the opening
clause of the Constitution . . . .”279 Although she begins with this reference to § 1,
and notes, as did Mahomed JP in Makwanyane, that this governs the conduct of all
three branches of government,280 in the paragraphs that follow, she draws on the
values of transformation281 and cosmopolitanism.282 Both of these values are seen
as contributing to the foundational value of protecting and promoting human
rights283 and all of this influenced her assessment as to whether the South African
government owed the petitioners a duty to provide them diplomatic protection. 284
They similarly influenced her view that it was appropriate for the Court to issue a
declaratory order regarding the government’s obligations in this regard.285
In S v Thebus & Another,286 Justice Moseneke mentioned the concept of
the “objective normative value system” when addressing a challenge to the
common purpose doctrine in criminal law (conspiracy law). The complainants
argued that by severing the requirement for a causal connection between the
defendant and the crime committed, the defendant’s rights to freedom and dignity
were infringed.287 In determining if these rights had been infringed, the Court
noted that they could only be limited for just cause and that “[t]he meaning of
‘just cause’ must be grounded upon and consonant with the values expressed in §
1 of the Constitution and gathered from the provisions of the Constitution.”288
41(1) (the Principles of Cooperative Government) and in the Interim Constitution. Id.
279. Kaunda v President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) at 298 (S.
Afr.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Kaunda involved the issue of whether the
Constitution required that the government respond to requests by its citizens for aid when
they were arrested outside of the country in Zimbabwe and detained there under conditions
that were alleged to violate international human rights norms. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 298-99 (drawing on S. AFR. CONST. 1998, pmbl. & § 1).
282. Id. at 299 (drawing on the Preamble, the political history leading up to the
Interim Constitution and Final Constitution and South Africa’s international law
obligations).
283. Id. at 298-99. Here, she draws on the Preamble, and sections 1 and 7(2).
284. Id. at 313-17.
285. Id. at 315.
286. 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) ¶¶ 27-28 (S. Afr.).
287. Id. ¶ 34.
288. Id. ¶ 39 (citing S v Boesak 2001 (1) SA 912 (CC) at 925-26 n.57 (S. Afr.)). In a
similar vein, acting Justices Farlam and Navsa, in their partially dissenting opinion in
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail & Other v Rail Commuters Action Group & Other, used the idea
of an “objective value system” to give a broader interpretation to “public interest” than that
given by the majority and other concurring opinions. 2003 (6) SA 349 (SCA) at 379 (S.
Afr.) (quoting Carmichele 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 961, 967, 968 (S. Afr.)).
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However, the Court did not explicitly draw from § 1 nor other provisions in the
Constitution, but rather alluded to the legitimate interest in deterring criminal
conspiracies as a way of deterring crime.289
Davis, J in Geldenhuys v Minister of Safety & Security & Another,290 in a
case involving the death of an inmate, also drew on the Court’s decision in
Carmichele noting both the need for an effective remedy and for the common law
to be developed in accordance with the matrix of the Constitution’s objective
normative value system.291 He took pains to emphasize not only the preamble and
§ 1 language of establishing a society based on human dignity, equality, and
freedom as well as “institutions of government which are open, transparent and
accountable to the people whom they serve,”292 but also the transformative values
of the Constitution. As he stated:
The content of this normative system does not only depend on an
abstract philosophical inquiry, but rather upon an understanding
that the Constitution mandates the development of a society that
breaks clearly and decisively from the past and where
institutions that operated prior to our constitutional dispensation
had to be instilled with a new operational vision based on the
foundational values of our constitutional system.293
He eloquently recounted how the facts of the present case recall the grim
past of the “systematic destruction of human dignity of people who were in the
custody of the police.”294 As he stated, “[t]hat was our past and it can no longer be
our future, for if it is, then the wonderful aspirations and magnificent dreams
contained in the Constitution will turn to post-Apartheid nightmares.”295
Justices O’Regan and Sachs, in their partially concurring and partially
dissenting opinions in S v Jordan,296 confronted the issue of whether provisions of
the Sexual Offences Act, making prostitution illegal, were unconstitutional
because they embodied and enforced a particular view of private morality. 297
Justices O’Regan and Sachs argued that the “Constitution . . . does not debar the
State from enforcing morality” because the Bill of Rights is “founded on deep

289. Id. at 373.
290. 2002 (4) SA 719 (C) (S. Afr.).
291. Id. at 728 (citing Carmichele 2001 (4) SA at 960-61).
292. Id.
293. Id. As he later noted, “[t]he transformation of our legal concepts must, at least in
part, be shaped by memory of that which lay at the very heart of our apartheid past.” Id. at
729.
294. Id. at 728.
295. Id. at 728-29.
296. 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) (S. Afr.).
297. Id. at 682-83.
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civic morality,”298 and that deep civic morality is found in the language from
Carmichele regarding the Constitution’s “objective value system.”299 The upshot
is that, “[t]he State has accordingly not only the right but the duty to promote the
foundational values of the Interim Constitution.” One of the most important of
these is to “create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to
citizenship in a democratic constitutional State in which there is equality between
men and women.”300
The question was not whether the act was created with unconstitutional
values, but whether today it could be justified by a set of moral views that
engendered the constitutional values.301 They concluded that, “[i]n our view, the
Act does overall continue to pursue an important and legitimate constitutional
purpose, namely the control of commercial sex.”302 Further, they were not
convinced “that the overall purpose of the legislation is manifestly inconsistent
with the values of our new order.”303
Acting Justice Cameron, in his concurring opinion in Brisley v
Drotsky,304 attempted to shed light on why the court was hesitant to import the
concept of boni mores or the legal convictions of the community into contract
law.305 While noting that the concept is now to be replaced with the “appropriate
norms of the objective value system embodied in the Constitution,”306 that concept
does not give the courts “a general jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the basis
of judicially perceived notions of unjustness or to determine their enforceability
on the basis of imprecise notions of good faith.”307 This is because contractual
autonomy is said to embody both the values of freedom and dignity, at least when
stripped of its “extreme excesses.”308 He thus concluded that, “[t]he Constitution
requires that its values be employed to achieve a careful balance between the
unacceptable excesses of contractual ‘freedom,’ and securing a framework within
which the ability to contract enhances rather than diminishes our self-respect and

298. Id. at 683.
299. Id. (quoting Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. & Another 2001 (4) SA 938
(CC) at 962 (S. Afr.)).
300. Id. at 683-84 (citing S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, pmbl.). Chapter 1 of the
Interim Constitution was titled “Constituent and Formal Provisions” rather than “Founding
Provisions,” and while it contained sections on the national symbols, languages and
supremacy of the Constitution, it did not contain a section on citizenship, nor on
constitutional values as found in S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 3.
301. Jordan, (6) SA at 684, 687-88.
302. Id. at 687.
303. Id. at 688.
304. 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
305. Id. at 35. The concept provides the content for the element of wrongfulness in
delict.
306. Id. (quoting Carmichele (4) SA at 962).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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dignity.”309 Although Cameron AJ does not shed much light on the objective
value system, it is clear from the discussion that the system does include the
values of freedom and dignity as found in §1, but less clear that it includes the
value of equality.
Finally, in S v Ndhlovu & Others,310 Acting Justice Cameron again
referred to the “norms of the objective value system.”311 Here it was used to
determine if the scheme in § 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of
1988 (which conflated admissibility of hearsay evidence with its reliability) was
compatible with those norms and, thus, the Final Constitution. He determined that
the statute's fundamental test, the “interests of justice,” and the criteria it posits to
determine if the test was satisfied, did comport with the Constitution and its
values.312 Cameron AJ noted that, “[i]n making the admission of hearsay evidence
subject to broader, more rational and flexible considerations, the 1988 Act’s
general approach is, moreover, in keeping with developments in other democratic
societies based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”313
CONCLUSION
The cases examined above are less than satisfactory if one is looking for
a single comprehensive and coherent fount of justice for working South Africa’s
common law pure. Nonetheless, it is not only unreasonable, but perhaps
undesirable, to expect that the courts and commentators would all agree on a
conception of justice that best fits and justifies South Africa’s Constitution. Most
of these lawyers and judges were educated under a radically different legal system
in which spirits, purports and objects were largely eschewed, and where justice
was often snuck in at the margins and through various cracks in the system. We
should applaud the fact that there is passionate debate about the values that
underlie the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and that so many people are
struggling to fulfill the § 39(2) mandate. It is unfortunate that there are still
numerous advocates and judges who have not heeded the mandate to scrutinize
existing law for its congruence with the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of
Rights. It must be acknowledged, however, that this is rather lofty and difficult
business. As Aristotle cautioned long ago:
[M]en suppose that it requires no special wisdom to know what
is just and unjust, because it is not difficult to understand the
things about which the law pronounce. But the actions
309. Id. at 36.
310. 2002 (6) SA 305 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
311. Id. at 317 (citing Carmichele (4) SA at 962).
312. Id. at 320.
313. Id. (discussing S. AFR. CONST 1996, §§ 39(1)(c) & 36(1)).
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prescribed by law are only accidentally just actions. How an
action must be performed, how a distribution must be made to be
a just action or a just distribution – to know this is a harder task
than to know what medical treatment will produce health.314
As I argued above, I think it is more daunting to approach the application of the
Constitution directly through § 8 because it forces lawyers and judges to attempt
the uncharted territory of trying to determine if, and how, rights, which were
largely designed to apply to the state, should apply to private persons.315 I think it
is less daunting to start with the existing common law and to scrutinize it in light
of the values embodied in the Constitution.
The conscientious academic, advocate, and judge is not justified in
picking and choosing the values that she or he likes the most, feels most
comfortable with, or which best support the conclusion that she or he wants. The
Constitution directs otherwise. The Constitution challenges those whom it
touches to harmonize the Constitution with all of South African law, including
private law. This challenge would make little sense if the Constitution was not in
harmony with itself, or if it could not be interpreted as embodying a coherent
spirit, purport and set of objects. Section 39(2) is premised on that possibility.
Thus, the conscientious jurist should attempt, as much as possible, to reconcile all
of the values of the Bill of Rights and Constitution when interpreting and
developing the law.
These values can be reconciled. They overwhelmingly support a caring,
egalitarian, transformative conception of justice that has drawn from the very best
of human rights traditions. Civil and political rights are not separate from, nor in
conflict with, socio-economic rights. Both sets of rights are advanced when each
is advanced. Although freedom and equality are often in tension, properly
conceived, they too complement, rather than undermine, one another. Although
rights and liberties can be put in jeopardy by the state, the history of Apartheid
demonstrates that rights and liberties can also be put in jeopardy by individuals
and corporations. The strict separation of private and public domains, as well as
the conservative libertarian approaches to “private” law simply are not consistent
with the values of the new constitutional order.
In conclusion, it may be asserted that this bucks the trend away from
common law legal “developments,” or as Fredrick Schauer, puts it, “the failure of
the common law.”316 In the U.S., and perhaps around the world, the celebrated

314. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, ch. 9, 311 (H. Rackham trans.,
1934).
315. It should be noted that the bulk of South African lawyers had no exposure to
constitutional rights, much less the horizontal application of constitutional rights, during
their formal education.
316. See Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765
(2004).
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role of the common law appears to be waning in favor of statutory law. While in
the U.S. judges appear more constrained in their law making powers,317 South
Africa’s Constitution is calling on judges to reinterpret and develop the common
law anew. While people may have become disillusioned at the notion that judges
can somehow “find” the law, or develop it by drawing from a fountain of justice
that is “out there,” South Africa’s Constitution is less utopian. It asks judges to
draw from the fountain of justice that informs the spirit, purport, and objects of its
Bill of Rights.

317. See id.

